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WHY  ROBERT  MUELLER’S  APPOINTMENT  AS
SPECIAL  COUNSEL  WAS  UNLAWFUL
Steven G. Calabresi* & Gary Lawson**
Since 1999, when the independent counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act
expired, the Department of Justice (DOJ) has had in place regulations providing for the appoint-
ment of “special counsels” who possess “the full power and independent authority to exercise all
investigative and prosecutorial functions of any United States Attorney.”  Appointments under
these regulations, such as the May 17, 2017 appointment of Robert S. Mueller to investigate the
Trump campaign, are patently unlawful, for three distinct reasons.
First, all federal offices must be “established by Law,” and there is no statute authorizing
such an office in the DOJ.  We conduct what we think is the first thorough examination of the
statutes structuring the DOJ to show that the statutory provisions relied upon by the DOJ and
lower courts for the appointment of special counsels over the past two decades do not—and even
obviously do not—authorize the creation and appointment of special counsels at the level of
United States Attorneys.  They authorize the creation and appointment of special counsels to
“assist” United States Attorneys, and they allow existing Senate-confirmed United States Attor-
neys to serve also as special counsels, but they do not remotely authorize the creation of the kind of
special counsels represented by Robert Mueller who replace rather than assist United States Attor-
neys. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), does not hold to the contrary, because no
question was raised in that case about the validity of the independent counsel’s appointment.
Second, even if one chooses to overlook the absence of statutory authority for the position,
there is no statute specifically authorizing the Attorney General, rather than the President by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint such a special counsel.  Under the Appoint-
ments Clause, inferior officers can be appointed by department heads only if Congress so directs by
statute—and so directs specifically enough to overcome a clear-statement presumption in favor of
presidential appointment and senatorial confirmation.  No such statute exists for the special
counsel.
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Third, the special counsel is, in all events, a superior rather than inferior officer, and thus
cannot be appointed by any means other than presidential appointment and senatorial confirma-
tion regardless of what any statutes purport to say.  This is obviously true as a matter of original
meaning, and it is even true as a matter of case law once one understands that neither Morri-
son v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988), nor Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651 (1997),
can plausibly be read to say that any person who is in any fashion subordinate to another
executive official is an “inferior” officer.  Such a reading of those decisions leads to the ludicrous
result that there is only one noninferior officer in every federal department, which is a good reason
not to read them that way.
There are surely times when special counsels are appropriate.  Both statutes and the Consti-
tution provide ample means for such appointments through the use of existing United States
Attorneys with unimpeachable credentials and reputations for standing above politics.  Any
number of United States Attorneys have performed these functions with distinction.  Statutes and
the Constitution do not, however, permit the Attorney General to appoint a private citizen as a
substitute United States Attorney under the title “special counsel.”  That is what happened on
May 17, 2017.  That appointment was unlawful, as are all of the legal actions that have flowed
from it.
The D.C. Circuit’s unreasoned February 26, 2019 opinion in In re Grand Jury Investi-
gation upholding Mueller’s appointment does not come to grips with any of these arguments.
The panel decision asserts (falsely) that the issues were either waived by the party challenging the
appointment or are readily resolved by Supreme Court precedent.  If the latter claim was true,
those precedents would cry out for clarification or reconsideration by the Court.  But that latter
claim is only even minimally plausible based on the most superficial skimming of the applicable
precedents.
The statutory and constitutional structure of federal law enforcement is a serious matter,
and one might have hoped that the federal courts—and the Department of Justice—would devote
a bit more mental energy to that matter than they have thus far expended.
INTRODUCTION
On May 17, 2017, acting Attorney General Attorney General Rod J.
Rosenstein,1 appointed former Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Direc-
tor Robert S. Mueller to be a special counsel for the United States Depart-
ment of Justice.  Mueller was ordered to investigate whether Donald Trump’s
2016 presidential campaign illegally colluded with the government of Russia
to influence the 2016 presidential election and to bring any appropriate
1 Rosenstein was acting Attorney General for those matters within the Department of
Justice for which then–Attorney General Jeff Sessions recused himself. See Press Release,
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Sessions Statement on Recusal (Mar. 2, 2017),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-sessions-statement-recusal. We do not
address here whether former Attorney General Sessions’ recusal was necessary or appropri-
ate under Department of Justice regulations regarding recusal. See 28 C.F.R. § 45.2 (2018).
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prosecutions.2  At the time of his appointment, Mr. Mueller was a private
citizen not then employed by the Department of Justice.3
On March 22, 2019, nearly two years after his appointment, Mr. Mueller
concluded his investigation and delivered a 488-page report to Attorney Gen-
eral William Barr.4  The report did not charge or recommend charging any-
one with a crime involving contact with Russian officials or agents because
“[t]he investigation did not establish . . . an agreement to commit any sub-
stantive violation of federal criminal law—including foreign-influence and
campaign-finance laws.”5  Nor did the investigation “yield evidence sufficient
to sustain any charge that any individual affiliated with the Trump Campaign
acted as an agent of a foreign principal . . . subject to the direction or control
of the government of Russia, or any official thereof.”6  The special counsel
also investigated whether President Trump obstructed justice during the
course of the investigation and “determined not to make a traditional
prosecutorial judgment,” and thus “did not draw ultimate conclusions about
the President’s conduct.”7  Attorney General Barr and Deputy Attorney Gen-
eral Rosenstein concluded that no prosecution for obstruction of justice was
warranted.8  With that, the Justice Department investigation was closed, leav-
ing the aftermath to the political arena.
Or so one might think.  But before closing up shop, Special Counsel
Mueller empaneled a grand jury,9 issued hundreds of subpoenas,10 indicted
2 See Order No. 3915-2017, Appointment of Special Counsel to Investigate Russian
Interference with the 2016 Presidential Election and Related Matters (May 17, 2017),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/967231/download [hereinafter Appoint-
ment Memo].
3 Mueller had joined the prominent law firm of WilmerHale in 2014. See Former Direc-
tor of the FBI Robert Mueller III Joins WilmerHale, WILMERHALE (Mar. 24, 2014), https://
www.wilmerhale.com/en/insights/news/former-director-of-the-fbi-robert-mueller-iii-joins-
wilmerhale.
4 ROBERT S. MUELLER III, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION INTO
RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION (2019) [hereinafter MUELLER
REPORT], https://www.justice.gov/storage/report.pdf.
5 1 MUELLER REPORT, supra note 4, at 181.
6 Id. at 183.
7 2 MUELLER REPORT, supra note 4, at 182.
8 See Letter from William P. Barr, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to the Committee
on the Judiciary (Mar. 24, 2019), https://judiciary.house.gov/sites/democrats.judiciary.
house.gov/files/documents/AG%20March%2024%202019%20Letter%20to%20House%
20and%20Senate%20Judiciary%20Committees.pdf.
9 See Spencer S. Hsu, Federal Grand Jury Working in Mueller Probe Is Extended, WASH.
POST (Jan. 4, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/legal-issues/federal-grand-
jury-working-in-mueller-probe-is-extended/2019/01/04/e480b364-105f-11e9-8938-5898adc
28fa2_story.html.
10 Some of those subpoenas have been the subject of motions to quash. See In re
Grand Jury Investigation, 315 F. Supp. 3d 602 (D.D.C. 2018), aff’d, 916 F.3d 1047 (D.C. Cir.
2019); United States v. Concord Mgmt. & Consulting LLC, 317 F. Supp. 3d 598 (D.D.C.
2018).
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at least thirty-three people and three companies,11 secured seven guilty
pleas,12 and obtained convictions on eight counts in a criminal trial.13  Dur-
ing its two years of operation, the special counsel’s office performed numer-
ous acts with formal legal consequences, and many of those acts continue to
have serious effects even after the investigation ceased.
All of those legally consequential acts were and are unlawful.
Robert Muller’s appointment to be a special counsel was unlawful on
both statutory and constitutional grounds.  Congress has not authorized by
law the position of special counsel to which Mueller was appointed; Congress
has not by law vested in the Attorney General the power to appoint inferior
officer special counsels; and the office to which Mueller has been appointed
is not, in any event, an inferior office but is instead an office to which
appointment requires presidential nomination and confirmation by the Sen-
ate.  Every legal act that Robert Mueller has taken since May 17, 2017, is
therefore null and void.14
We reach this conclusion while recognizing that there are times when it
makes sense to use special counsels with a reputation for independence and
integrity to investigate presidential or other high-level wrongdoing.  In these
cases, there is often reason to doubt whether the political appointees of the
Department of Justice could conduct investigations with at least the appear-
ance of objectivity.  The creation of a special counsel to investigate high-level
wrongdoing is fine in principle and may, on occasion, be commendable in
practice.  But, there are lawful and unlawful ways to go about creating a spe-
cial counsel.  In this instance, quite unfortunately, acting Attorney General
Rod Rosenstein acted unlawfully in appointing private citizen Robert Mueller
to be a special counsel to investigate President Trump’s alleged collusion
with Russia.  We begin by explaining where Rosenstein went wrong.
The constitutionally—and, under present law, statutorily—correct way
to appoint a freestanding special counsel is to ask one of the ninety-three
existing Senate-confirmed U.S. Attorneys to take on the germane task of
investigating presidential or other high-level wrongdoing.  Most U.S. Attor-
11 Jesus Rodriguez & Beatrice Jin, The Mueller Indictments So Far: Lies, Trolls, and Hacks,
POLITICO (Dec. 7, 2018), https://www.politico.com/interactives/2018/interactive_mueller
-indictments-russia-cohen-manafort/.
12 Jason Breslow, All the Criminal Charges to Emerge from Robert Mueller’s Investigation, NPR
(Dec. 9, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/12/09/643444815/all-the-criminal-charges-to-
emerge-so-far-from-robert-muellers-investigation.
13 See Matt Zapotosky et al., Manafort Convicted on 8 Counts; Mistrial Declared on 10
Others, WASH. POST (Aug. 21, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/manafort-jury-suggests-it-cannot-come-to-a-consensus-on-a-single-count/2018/08/
21/a2478ac0-a559-11e8-a656-943eefab5daf_story.html.
14 We leave for another time whether any of his actions can be saved by the de facto
officer doctrine.  The short answer is no.  For reasons that one of us has explored at great
length elsewhere, the de facto officer doctrine cannot save actions where the office itself is
unlawful and there is thus more than a mere technical defect in the appointment process.
See Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, The Hobbesian Constitution: Governing Without Authority, 95
NW. U. L. REV. 581, 595–96 (2001).
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neys are career prosecutors whose political ties tend to be to their home-state
senators and not to the President who nominated them.  Many of them have
exemplary reputations for independence and integrity, as well as years of
prosecutorial experience, often working for both Democratic and Republi-
can administrations.  They are therefore Senate-confirmed officials of exem-
plary independence and integrity who are constitutionally and statutorily
qualified to investigate the President of the United States or any other high-
level governmental official or presidential friend.
Four U.S. Attorneys who served as special counsels or performed similar
functions without the formal appointment or title in the last twenty years
prove this point.  On December 30, 2003, Patrick Fitzgerald, who was then
the U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois, was lawfully
appointed15 by the then–acting Attorney General to investigate the Valerie
Plame leak affair, which arose within the jurisdiction of the District of Colum-
bia District Court.16  Mr. Fitzgerald, who was a Senate-confirmed officer of
the United States, prosecuted and secured the conviction of Vice President
Richard Cheney’s Chief of Staff, Scooter Libby, in the District of Columbia
District Court.17  Since Libby did not implicate Vice President Cheney, Mr.
Fitzgerald’s investigation stopped there.  It should be added that Fitzgerald
had a powerful reputation for independence and integrity, having indicted
and secured the conviction for bribery of the sitting governor of Illinois.18
Everyone had complete confidence in Fitzgerald’s investigation.
Three other Senate-confirmed U.S. Attorneys, with reputations for inde-
pendence like Mr. Fitzgerald’s, have constitutionally been asked by the Attor-
ney General to investigate high-level wrongdoing in recent years.  The
Senate-confirmed U.S. Attorney in Maryland, Rod Rosenstein (ironically),
who had served under both Presidents Bush and Obama, was asked by Presi-
dent Obama’s Attorney General, Eric Holder, to investigate and prosecute
General James Cartwright, a former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
15 The first person appointed under the 1999 Reno Regulations was former Senator
John Danforth, who was appointed in September 1999 to investigate the 1993 tragedy in
Waco, Texas, involving the Justice Department’s raid on a Branch Davidian compound
that resulted in seventy-six deaths. See Pete Yost, Danforth to Head Waco Inquiry, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (Sept. 8, 1999), https://www.apnews.com/ee472a93fca37920411c1ad533e81ee1;
Waco Siege, HISTORY (Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.history.com/topics/1990s/waco-siege.
For the reasons given in this Article, that appointment was unlawful.
16 See Ashcroft Recused from Leak Investigation, UNITED PRESS INT’L (Dec. 30, 2003),
https://www.upi.com/Top_News/2003/12/30/Ashcroft-recused-from-leak-investigation/
48811072812243/.
17 See Andrew Glass, ‘Scooter’ Libby Convicted of Perjury, March 6, 2007, POLITICO (Mar. 6,
2014), https://www.politico.com/story/2014/03/this-day-in-politics-104300.  President
Trump pardoned Mr. Libby, more than a decade after his conviction, on April 13, 2018.
See Press Release, White House, Statement from the Press Secretary Regarding the Pardon
of I. “Scooter” Lewis Libby (Apr. 13, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-state
ments/statement-press-secretary-regarding-pardon-scooter-lewis-libby/.
18 See Annie Sweeney, Fitzgerald: ‘The Vindication Is to the People,’ CHI. TRIB. (June 27,
2011), https://www.chicagotribune.com/nation-world/ct-xpm-2011-06-27-ct-met-bla
gojevich-fitzgerald-06-20110627-story.html.
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Staff, for leaking information to reporters.19  General Cartwright pled guilty
to this charge,20 and he was later pardoned.21  This is a second example of
the special counsel system working as it should.
In November 2017, then–Attorney General Jeff Sessions asked the Sen-
ate-confirmed U.S. Attorney for Utah, John W. Huber, who had held office
both under President Obama and President Trump, to investigate alleged
wrongdoing by the FBI in the District of Columbia District Court’s jurisdic-
tion.22  Mr. Huber took on this germane task, in addition to his duties as the
U.S. Attorney for Utah.  There is every reason to believe that U.S. Attorney
Huber will conduct this investigation thoroughly and in a nonpartisan way.
Finally, at some point in the spring of 2019, Attorney General William
Barr tasked John Durham, the U.S. Attorney for Connecticut, with investigat-
ing the origins of the Department of Justice’s probes of the Trump campaign
in 2016.23
All of these investigations and prosecutions of high-level wrongdoing
were totally constitutional, legal, and appropriate, and they were (or are
being) conducted by prosecutors of the highest degree of independence and
integrity.
Our reading of the relevant statutes and the Appointments Clause would
allow a future Attorney General to ask any of the existing Senate-confirmed
U.S. Attorneys to serve as a special counsel or perform equivalent functions
in a case of alleged presidential or other high-level wrongdoing.  That
arrangement is perfectly constitutional and statutorily authorized.  Among
that group one can surely find someone with the intellect, integrity, and
character to be a special counsel as well as a United States Attorney.  There
are one hundred United States senators who play key roles in the selection of
the (at present) ninety-three United States Attorneys, so there will always be
some talented and independent-minded United States Attorneys who are not
friends or acquaintances of the President who could be tapped to investigate
the President.  In fact, many United States Attorneys, such as John Huber
and Rod Rosenstein, serve or have served both Democratic and Republican
administrations.
19 See Josh Gerstein, Holder Names Leak Probe Prosecutors, POLITICO (June 8, 2012),
https://www.politico.com/story/2012/06/holder-names-2-prosecutors-to-probe-leaks-
077228.
20 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chief of
Staff Pleads Guilty to Federal Felony in Leak Investigation (Oct. 17, 2016), https://www.
justice.gov/opa/pr/former-vice-chairman-joint-chiefs-staff-pleads-guilty-federal-felony-leak-
investigation.
21 See Pardons Granted by President Barak Obama (2009–2017), U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://
www.justice.gov/pardon/obama-pardons (last updated July 11, 2018).
22 See Jeff Mordock, John Huber, Who Will Investigate the FBI Is a Special Counsel in Every
Way but Name, WASH. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2018), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/20
18/apr/1/john-huber-us-attorney-leading-fbi-investigation-s/.
23 See Brooke Singman, Who Is John Durham? Prosecutor Tapped for Russia Proble Inquiry
Known as ‘Aggressive, Tireless, and Fair,’ FOX NEWS (May 15, 2019), https://www.foxnews.
com/politics/who-is-john-durham-prosecutor-russia-probe.
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What the Attorney General cannot lawfully do under the Constitution
and current statutes, however, is pluck a private citizen like Robert Mueller
out of retirement, create a putatively inferior office of special counsel to
investigate the President for illegal collusion with Russia during the 2016
presidential campaign, and then appoint that private citizen to be a special
counsel.  First, such an action violates the current statutes enacted by Con-
gress for the structure of the Department of Justice.  Those statutes do
authorize the appointment of counsels, but those counsels must “assist”24
United States Attorneys.  The office held by Mueller replaced rather than
assisted United States Attorneys, and there is no legal authority for such an
office.  For years, the Department of Justice has mindlessly been relying on
purported statutory authority for U.S. Attorney–replacing special counsels
that simply does not exist.  We will demonstrate this point in detail.25
Second, such an action violates the Appointments Clause, which
provides:
[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of
the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls,
Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States,
whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall
be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of
such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the
Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.26
The default rule for federal appointments is nomination by the President
and confirmation by the Senate, and that never occurred with Special Coun-
sel Mueller.  Robert Mueller purported to be an inferior officer of the United
States,27 but Congress has not by law vested the power to appoint inferior
officers in the Attorney General.  The Appointments Clause is as clear as day
that inferior officers can only be appointed by any means other than presi-
dential nomination and senatorial consent where Congress by law expressly
authorizes the President, the courts of law, or the heads of departments to
appoint them.  This amounts to a constitutionally prescribed clear statement
rule.28  We prove in this Article beyond a reasonable doubt that the Attorney
General has no statutory authority to create and appoint inferior officer spe-
cial counsels who do not assist a United States Attorney to whom they are
subordinate.  We canvas every single provision of Title 28 bearing on the
Department of Justice, and there is quite simply no statute that vests in the
Attorney General the power to appoint such inferior officers.
In contrast to the organic statute of the Department of Justice, the
organic statutes of the Agriculture, Education, Health and Human Services,
and Transportation Departments do contain clear inferior officer appointment
power clauses.  Thus, the Agriculture Secretary “may appoint such officers and
24 28 U.S.C. § 543 (2012).
25 See infra Part II.
26 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
27 See 2 MUELLER REPORT, supra note 4, at 175.
28 See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460–61 (1991).
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employees . . . and such experts, as are necessary to execute the functions
vested in him”;29 the Education Secretary “is authorized to appoint and fix
the compensation of such officers and employees, including attorneys, as
may be necessary to carry out the functions of the Secretary and the Depart-
ment”;30 the Health and Human Services Secretary “is authorized to appoint
and fix the compensation of such officers and employees”;31 and the Trans-
portation Secretary “may appoint and fix the pay of officers and employees of
the Department of Transportation.”32  For good measure, the Administrative
Procedure Act says that “[e]ach agency shall appoint as many administrative
law judges as are necessary for [hearing and deciding cases].”33  And for the
coup de grace, Congress gave the Attorney General power to “appoint such
additional officers and employees as he deems necessary”34 specifically for the
Bureau of Prisons but not more broadly for other units of the Department of
Justice.
Why did Congress choose to give general inferior officer appointment
power to the Secretaries of Agriculture, Education, Health and Human Ser-
vices, and Transportation, but not to the Attorney General (except in the
limited context of the Bureau of Prisons)?  Probably because of the unique
threat that a bad Attorney General could pose to civil liberties, to the states,
which United States senators represent, and to the separation of powers.  A
bad Attorney General today (in 2019) could appoint a special counsel to
probe the lives of Democratic Minority Leader Charles Schumer or of House
Speaker Nancy Pelosi, looking for dirt.  One shudders to think what abuses
might have been condoned in the McCarthy era if Attorneys General had
unlimited and unchecked power to create inferior officer special counsels.
Federal prosecutors are fearsome creatures.  Attorney General Robert
Jackson, speaking to the Second Annual Conference of United States Attor-
neys on April 1, 1940, said the following:
It would probably be within the range of that exaggeration permitted in
Washington to say that assembled in this room is one of the most powerful
peace-time forces known to our country.  The prosecutor has more control
over life, liberty, and reputation than any other person in America.  His dis-
cretion is tremendous.  He can have citizens investigated and, if he is that
kind of person, he can have this done to the tune of public statements and
veiled or unveiled intimations.  Or the prosecutor may choose a more subtle
course and simply have a citizen’s friends interviewed.  The prosecutor can
order arrests, present cases to the grand jury in secret session, and on the
basis of his one-sided presentation of the facts, can cause the citizen to be
indicted and held for trial.  He may dismiss the case before trial, in which
case the defense never has a chance to be heard.  Or he may go on with a
29 7 U.S.C. § 610(a) (2012).
30 20 U.S.C. § 3461(a) (2012).
31 42 U.S.C. § 913 (2012).
32 49 U.S.C. § 323(a) (2012).
33 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (2012).  Administrative law judges are constitutional officers. See
Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018).
34 18 U.S.C. § 4041 (2012).
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public trial.  If he obtains a conviction, the prosecutor can still make recom-
mendations as to sentence, as to whether the prisoner should get probation
or a suspended sentence, and after he is put away, as to whether he is a fit
subject for parole.  While the prosecutor at his best is one of the most benefi-
cent forces in our society, when he acts from malice or other base motives,
he is one of the worst.
These powers have been granted to our law-enforcement agencies
because it seems necessary that such a power to prosecute be lodged some-
where.  This authority has been granted by people who really wanted the
right thing done—wanted crime eliminated—but also wanted the best in
our American traditions preserved.
Because of this immense power to strike at citizens, not with mere indi-
vidual strength, but with all the force of government itself, the post of Federal
District Attorney from the very beginning has been safeguarded by presidential appoint-
ment, requiring confirmation of the Senate of the United States.  You are thus
required to win an expression of confidence in your character by both the
legislative and the executive branches of the government before assuming
the responsibilities of a federal prosecutor.35
Congress did not create the Department of Justice in 1789 along with
the Department of State, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of
War, and the Post Office.  The Judiciary Act of 1789 created an office of
Attorney General of the United States (but no Department of Justice), and
sixteen District Attorneys, now called United States Attorneys, who had to be
nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate.36  Permanent
United States Attorneys have always, throughout all 230 years of American
history, required nomination by the President and confirmation by the Sen-
ate.  The United States Department of Justice was not created until 1870,37
after the Civil War, and even then, Congress has always been jealous of the
powers it delegates to the DOJ for civil rights reasons, for federalism reasons,
and for separation of powers reasons.  Those concerns are simply not as sali-
ent with the Departments of Agriculture, Education, Health and Human Ser-
vices, and Transportation.
By blundering ahead on May 17, 2017, and creating an inferior special
counsel who was not subordinate to a U.S. Attorney, which he had no power
to create, and then appointing a private citizen to that office, acting Attorney
General Rod Rosenstein violated the Constitution.  Moreover, none of the
statutes he cited as granting him the authority to create this particular special
counsel actually granted him that authority.  Nor do any statutes that he did
not cite contain the necessary authority.  Congress has not by law delegated
to the Attorney General the power to create inferior officer special coun-
35 Robert H. Jackson, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Address at the Second Annual
Conference of United States Attorneys: The Federal Prosecutor (Apr. 1, 1940), https://
www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2011/09/16/04-01-1940.pdf (emphasis
added).
36 See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92–93.
37 See About DOJ, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/about (last visited Sept. 26,
2019).
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sels—or inferior officer Solicitors General or inferior officer United States
Attorneys—who do anything more than “assist” United States Attorneys on
specific matters calling for outside expertise.  Rosenstein broke the law when
he appointed Robert Mueller.
On February 26, 2019, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit upheld the legality of Mueller’s appointment in a case challenging
Mueller’s authority to issue a subpoena.38  The D.C. Circuit’s brief, unrea-
soned opinion does not come to grips with any of the arguments that we
present—or, for that matter, with any of the arguments that were presented
to the court.  The panel decision asserts (falsely) that the issues discussed in
this article were either waived by the party challenging Mueller’s appoint-
ment or are readily resolved by Supreme Court precedent.  If Supreme Court
precedents truly foreclosed the issues that we are raising, those precedents
would cry out for clarification or reconsideration by the Supreme Court.  But
the D.C. Circuit relied on a remarkably superficial skimming of the applica-
ble precedents, which, as we later demonstrate in detail, do not in fact
resolve that issues that we are raising here.  It is almost as though the D.C.
Circuit did not want to look behind the curtain.  The statutory and constitu-
tional structure of federal law enforcement, however, is a serious matter.
One might hope that the federal courts—and the Department of Justice—
would devote a bit more mental energy to that matter than they have thus far
expended.
This Article will proceed in the following Parts.  Part I briefly discusses
the Mueller appointment and the authority claimed to make it.  Part II dis-
sects the statutes, which it is claimed support an Attorney General power to
create inferior officers who do not assist U.S. Attorneys, and demonstrates
that none of those statutes does any such thing.  That Part also explains that
the legal question raised here was not raised, litigated, briefed, or decided in
the Watergate Tapes Case, United States v. Nixon,39 so that case cannot serve
as precedent to support Rosenstein’s actions.  Part III argues that the Consti-
tution does not permit the appointment of an officer, unconfirmed by the
Senate, with Robert Mueller’s range of authority.  This Article concludes with
recommendations of how to amend the Department of Justice’s regulations
on the appointment of special counsels so as to render them lawful in future
cases.
Whatever one thinks of Robert Mueller, Donald Trump, Paul Manafort,
Michael Flynn, James Comey, or any of the other dramatis personae who
have filled headlines for the past few years, law matters.  Robert Mueller’s
investigation, and the legal action that has resulted from it, was statutorily
and constitutionally unlawful.  There are ways consistent, both with existing
statutes and with the Constitution, for the Department of Justice to create a
special counsel, and those methods have been employed on occasion—and
are actually being employed in some cases as we write this Article.  But the
38 See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 916 F.3d 1047, 1056 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
39 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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appointment by the Attorney General of a private citizen to a position that
amounts to a supercharged U.S. Attorney is not one of them.
I. THE APPOINTMENT OF ROBERT MUELLER
As we noted at the beginning of this Article, on May 17, 2017, U.S. Dep-
uty Attorney General Rod J. Rosenstein, in the capacity of acting Attorney
General,40 appointed former FBI Director, and at that time private
WilmerHale lawyer, Robert S. Mueller to be a special counsel for the Depart-
ment of Justice.  Mueller’s charge as special counsel was to
conduct the investigation confirmed by then-FBI Director James B. Comey
in testimony before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
on March 20, 2017, including:
(i) any links and/or coordination between the Russian government and
individuals associated with the campaign of President Donald Trump;
and
(ii) any matters that arose or may arise directly from the investigation;
and
(iii) any other matters within the scope of 28 C.F.R. § 600.4(a).41
The special counsel was “authorized to prosecute federal crimes arising from
the investigation of these matters.”42
For two years after his appointment, Mueller’s investigation consumed
United States law and politics.  The special counsel’s office assembled a team
of more than a dozen lawyers and more than a dozen supporting staff mem-
bers, with expenditures exceeding $25 million.43  As we noted in our intro-
duction, Mueller as special counsel empaneled a grand jury,44 issued
numerous subpoenas,45 indicted at least thirty-three people and three com-
panies,46 secured seven guilty pleas,47 and obtained convictions on eight
counts in a criminal trial.48
40 It is actually a serious question whether the Attorney General’s recusal made Deputy
Attorney General Rosenstein the acting Attorney General.  We do not address that ques-
tion in this Article. See In Re Grand Jury Investigation, 916 F.3d 1047, 1054–56 (D.C. Cir.
2019).
41 Appointment Memo, supra note 2.
42 Id.
43 See Matt Zapotosky, Latest Expenditure Data Shows Mueller Probe Cost About $25 Million
Through September, WASH. POST (Dec. 14, 2018), washingtonpost.com/world/national-secur
ity/latest-expenditure-data-shows-mueller-probe-cost-about-25-million-through-september/
2018/12/14/ae00f216-ffe5-11e8-ad40-cdfd0e0dd65a_story.html.
44 Hsu, supra note 9.
45 Some of those subpoenas have been the subject of motions to quash. See In re
Grand Jury Investigation, 315 F. Supp. 3d 602 (D.D.C. 2018), aff’d, 916 F.3d 1047 (D.C. Cir.
2019); United States v. Concord Mgmt. & Consulting LLC, 317 F. Supp. 3d 598 (D.D.C.
2018).
46 Rodriguez & Jin, supra note 11.
47 Breslow, supra note 12.
48 Zapotosky et al., supra note 13.
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All of this prosecutorial activity has been unlawful.  Mr. Mueller was fully
capable of writing a report on any matter he wished to submit to the Depart-
ment of Justice,49 just as we are fully capable of writing a law review Article
and submitting it to anyone who will read it.  But Mr. Mueller had no more
legal authority to empanel grand juries and issue subpoenas to gather infor-
mation for that report, much less to issue indictments and obtain guilty pleas
and convictions, than we do.  The entire Mueller investigation has been a
legal nullity since the get-go.
Some of the legal problems with the Mueller investigation are similar to
the problems that plagued independent counsels under the Ethics in Gov-
ernment Act50 from 1978 to 1999, most notably that both Mueller and inde-
pendent counsels, such as Alexia Morrison, were appointed using procedures
appropriate for inferior officers of the United States rather than by presiden-
tial nomination and senatorial confirmation, as the Constitution requires for
the appointment of superior officers.51  The independent counsel appoint-
ment provisions were famously upheld as constitutional by the Supreme
Court in 1988 in Morrison v. Olson.52  We thought then, and we think today,
as does a growing number of legal observers and jurists, that Morrison v. Olson
was wrongly decided, and we believe that history has to some extent vindi-
cated, and will increasingly vindicate as time goes on, that position.  Justice
Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Morrison53 is already a classic that overshadows
the majority opinion, much like Justice Curtis’s dissenting opinion in Dred
Scott v. Sandford,54 Justice Harlan’s dissenting opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson,55
and Justice Holmes’s dissenting opinion in Lochner v. New York.56  But even if
one accepts Morrison v. Olson as good law, Mueller’s appointment as special
counsel is still unconstitutional.  The nature and scope of Mueller’s charge
shows him to be a superior rather than inferior officer even under the (erro-
neous) standard of Morrison v. Olson.  And as a matter of original meaning,
Mueller is obviously a superior rather than an inferior officer and therefore
can lawfully act only if appointed by the President with the advice and con-
sent of the Senate.  We explain all of this in Part III of this Article.
Before reaching that constitutional question, however, we first explore
an even more basic problem with Mueller’s appointment: there was and is no
49 See 28 C.F.R. § 600.8(c) (2019) (“At the conclusion of the Special Counsel’s work,
he or she shall provide the Attorney General with a confidential report explaining the
prosecution or declination decisions reached by the Special Counsel.”).
50 Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824.
51 We use the term “superior officer” rather than the more common term “principal
officer,” because the former is descriptively accurate while the latter is not.  Enormous
mischief has resulted from careless use of the constitutional term “principal officer.”  We
explain all of this in some detail later in this Article. See infra subsection III.B.1.
52 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
53 See id. at 697 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
54 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 564 (1857) (Curtis, J., dissenting), superseded by constitutional
amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
55 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
56 198 U.S. 45, 74 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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statutory authority for his office and appointment.  All offices in the govern-
ment of the United States that are not constitutionally mandated must be
created by law.  There is, quite simply, no law creating or authorizing the
creation of Mueller’s office, although there was a law (albeit an unconstitu-
tional one) creating the Office of Independent Counsel from 1978 to 1999.
The current special counsel framework is the creature of regulations promul-
gated by former Attorney General Janet Reno just before the Ethics in Gov-
ernment Act expired in 1999 without renewal by Congress.57  A regulation,
however, cannot create an office that is going to be filled by a constitutional
“Officer of the United States” that is not authorized by statute, and in the
absence of the independent counsel statute, the statutes creating and defin-
ing the Department of Justice simply do not authorize the creation and
appointment of special counsels such as Mueller.  To be sure, those statutes
do authorize the creation and appointment of certain kinds of special coun-
sels, but those counsels must “assist”58 United States Attorneys, which Muel-
ler did not.  His position was a freestanding office within the Department of
Justice, and he wielded the full powers of any United States Attorney.  Not
only does that make Mueller a superior officer, as we will show in Part III, it
also places his office outside the bounds of the statutes establishing the con-
tours of the Department of Justice, as we will show in Part II.
Remarkably, we do not believe that anyone has previously taken a careful
look at the statutory authorization for special counsels within the Depart-
ment of Justice.  We do so here.  We also in Part II closely examine the cases
that have generally taken by lower courts as establishing the legality of the
office of special counsel.  Even if one believes (as we do not) that caselaw can
trump statutory language, those cases simply do not hold that there is statu-
tory authorization for Mueller’s appointment as special counsel.  The lan-
guage in those cases used by the government to support that appointment is
dicta—and particularly ill-considered dicta—on issues that were never raised,
briefed, litigated, or decided.  Apart from a few unpersuasive, and in some
cases poorly reasoned, district court opinions issued in 201859 and one brief
and unreasoned D.C. Circuit opinion issued in early 201960 that rely on these
inapposite precedents, there is no judicial resolution of the statutory ques-
tions that we raise in Part II.
II. NO STATUTE AUTHORIZES THE APPOINTMENT OF A SPECIAL COUNSEL
WITH ROBERT MUELLER’S RANGE OF AUTHORITY
In Part III, we will explain why Robert Mueller was not, by constitutional
standards, an inferior officer who can be appointed to office without presi-
57 See Office of Special Counsel, 64 Fed. Reg. 37,038 (July 9, 1999) (codified at 28
C.F.R. §§ 600.1–600.10 (2019)) [hereinafter Reno Regulations].
58 28 U.S.C. § 543 (2012).
59 See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 315 F. Supp. 3d 602 (D.D.C. 2018) (poorly rea-
soned), aff’d, 916 F.3d 1047 (D.C. Cir. 2018); United States v. Concord Mgmt. & Consult-
ing LLC, 317 F. Supp. 3d 598 (D.D.C. 2018) (unpersuasive).
60 See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 916 F.3d 1047.
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dential nomination and senatorial confirmation.  But even if he was an infer-
ior officer who could properly be appointed by a department head, such as
the Attorney General, his appointment by the (acting) Attorney General
would still be invalid because it was not authorized by statute—and not
authorized in two distinct ways.  First, the office itself was not created by or
pursuant to a statute.  Second, even if one can somehow manufacture statu-
tory authorization for the position, Robert Mueller’s appointment to that
office by a department head, rather than by the President and the Senate,
was not specifically prescribed by statute, as it must be to permit appointment
of an officer by any means other than presidential nomination and senatorial
confirmation.61  As a matter of straightforward statutory interpretation, the
creation of Mueller’s office, his appointment to that office, and therefore his
criminal investigation, went forward without legal authority.
A. No Statute Authorizes the Creation of a Special Counsel with Robert Mueller’s
Range of Authority
The Constitution itself creates very few positions in the federal govern-
ment.  It creates the Congress, consisting of “a Senate and House of Repre-
sentatives,”62 the presidency and the vice presidency,63 a Supreme Court with
a Chief Justice,64 and that is all.  The Constitution assumes that there will be
“Ambassadors,”65 “other public Ministers and Consuls,”66 federal judges
other than the Chief Justice,67 and heads of executive “Departments”68 (and
specifically a “Treasury”)69 but it does not directly create any of those posi-
tions.  Instead, the Constitution commits the power to create federal offices
to Congress under the Necessary and Proper Clause,70 which gives Congress
power “[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying
into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Con-
61 A third potential problem is whether Jeff Sessions, notwithstanding his recusal, was
still the department head for Appointments Clause purposes when Mueller was appointed.
We do not address that problem in this Article.
62 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
63 See id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
64 See id. art. III, § 1.  There must be at least one member of the Supreme Court, titled
the Chief Justice, in order to preside over impeachment trials involving the President. See
id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
65 Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
66 Id.
67 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 9; id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; id. art. III, § 1.
68 Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2
69 Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
70 See E. Garrett West, Note, Congressional Power over Office Creation, 128 YALE L.J. 166,
177–83 (2018).  There were some suggestions at the Constitutional Convention that the
Constitution be written to create specific offices, but those suggestions were not adopted.
See id. at 170 n.8.
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stitution in the Government of the United States or in any Department or
Officer thereof.”71
A law creating offices to carry out executive functions is the quintessen-
tial law “necessary and proper for carrying into Execution” federal powers.
Indeed, James Madison and Charles Pinckney proposed making this applica-
tion of the Necessary and Proper Clause explicit by seeking to “insert
between ‘laws’ and ‘necessary’ ‘and establish all offices[,]’ it appearing to
them liable to cavil that the latter was not included in the former.”72  An all-
star chorus of Gouverneur Morris, James Wilson, John Rutledge, and Oliver
Ellsworth insisted “that the amendment could not be necessary,” and it was
voted down 9–2.73  History has vindicated the chorus and the Convention
vote; no one from 1789 onward has ever contested Congress’s clearly enu-
merated power to create federal offices under the Necessary and Proper
Clause.
More than this, Congress has the exclusive constitutional power to create
federal offices.  The Constitution does not give the President or the heads of
executive departments the power to create any offices and to appoint any
officers that they deem appropriate for any purpose.  Instead, it requires that
Congress first create all offices to which federal officers, superior or inferior,
can be appointed.  Elbridge Gerry at the Constitutional Convention sought
to make this explicit by adding “that no officer shall be app[ointe]d but to
offices created by the Constitution or by law.”74  A 6–5 majority rejected the
amendment as “unnecessary.”75  The majority was correct, for two separate
reasons.  First, no federal institution other than Congress has any enumer-
ated power to create offices.  Second, the Constitution textually establishes
congressional exclusivity through the Appointments Clause, which provides
for the appointment of “Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls,
Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States,
whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be
established by Law.”76  The addition of the emphasized phrase in the Appoint-
ments Clause was deliberate.  On September 15, 1787, “[a]fter ‘Officers of
the U.S. whose appointments are not otherwise provided for,’ were added
the words ‘and which shall be established by law.’”77  The “law” that estab-
lishes the office must be a statute; a regulation or executive (or judicial)
71 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.  The founding generation called this provision the
“Sweeping Clause,” see Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The “Proper” Scope of Federal
Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267, 270–71 (1993),
and that label was dominant into the early twentieth century.  We use (one of us reluc-
tantly) the modern label of “the Necessary and Proper Clause,” on the theory that it will be
more familiar to readers.
72 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 345 (Max Farrand ed.,
1911) [hereinafter RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION].
73 Id.
74 Id. at 550.
75 Id.
76 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
77 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 72, at 628.
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order does not constitute the kind of “law” that can create an office under
the Appointments Clause.78  Indeed, the Constitution consistently uses the
terms “law” and “laws,” when otherwise unqualified, to mean statutes.79  If
there is no establishment of an office by statute, there is no office to which
someone can be appointed.80
The offices that make up the Department of Justice are identified in the
statutes establishing and defining the contours of that Department.  The
Department of Justice was created on June 22, 1870.81  Its current structure,
as provided by statute, includes an Attorney General82 in whom is vested vir-
78 See Seth Barrett Tillman, Why Our Next President May Keep His or Her Senate Seat: A
Conjecture on the Constitution’s Incompatibility Clause, 4 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y
SIDEBAR 1, 20–22 (2009); West, supra note 70, at 177–83; Limitations on Presidential Power
to Create a New Executive Branch Entity to Receive and Administer Funds Under Foreign
Aid Legislation, 9 Op. O.L.C. 76, 77–78 (1985) [hereinafter Limitations on Presidential
Power].
79 See Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of Constitutional Inter-
pretation, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1267, 1315 (1996).  Occasionally, those terms are qualified, as in
the reference to “Offenses against the Law of Nations,” see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10, or
to the “Courts of Law.” Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.  But when used alone, “laws” consistently
means statutes. See Lawson & Moore, supra, at 1315 n.225.
80 Prior to the decision in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), Presidents could claim
statutory authority for the creation (subject to congressional disapproval) of some offices
pursuant to executive reorganization plans. See Reorganization Act of 1977, Pub. L. No.
95-17, 91 Stat. 29.  The current version of the Reorganization Act continues to provide that
presidential reorganization plans “may provide for the appointment and pay of the head
and one or more officers of any agency,” 5 U.S.C. § 904(2) (2012), but any such plans now
must be affirmatively approved by resolutions of both houses of Congress subject to presi-
dential presentment, see id. § 906, meaning that offices created by those plans are “estab-
lished by law.”  In any event, all such offices, both before and after Chadha, required
presidential appointment and senatorial confirmation “if the appointment is not to a posi-
tion in the competitive service.” Id. § 904.  We do not address here whether, as an original
matter, Congress could allow Presidents to create offices without specific authorization
through Article I, Section 7 legislation.  The Office of Legal Counsel has suggested that
Presidents might retain some kind of “emergency” power to create offices. See Limitations
on Presidential Power, supra note 78, at 78 n.1 (“There may be cases, however—in a
national emergency, for example—in which we would conclude that the President may, in
effect, create an office in order to carry out constitutional responsibilities that otherwise
could not be fulfilled.”).  We are doubtful of this claim, but we do not pursue that possibil-
ity here.  There have also been suggestions from time to time that ambassadors can be
created without statutory authorization. See West, supra note 70, at 197.  We are doubtful
of this claim as well, though if particular “ambassadors” do not actually have legal authority
to create rights and obligations, they may not be officers at all.  We do not pursue this
point either.  Clearly, neither a hypothetical “emergency” exception nor an “ambassado-
rial” exception applies to special counsels.
81 See An Act to Establish the Department of Justice, ch. 150, § 1, 16 Stat. 162, 162
(1870) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 501 (2012)).  For a detailed history of the
development of the Department of Justice, see In re Grand Jury Investigation, 315 F. Supp.
3d 602, 612–17 (D.D.C. 2018), aff’d, 916 F.3d 1047 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
82 See 28 U.S.C. § 503.
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tually all functions of the Department of Justice,83 a Deputy Attorney Gen-
eral,84 an Associate Attorney General,85 a Solicitor General,86 eleven
Assistant Attorneys General,87 one U.S. Attorney for each judicial district88
(of which there are currently ninety-four),89 a director of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation,90 a director of the U.S. Marshals Service,91 one U.S. Marshal
for each judicial district,92 a director of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Fire-
arms, and Explosives,93 a director of the Bureau of Prisons,94 twenty-one U.S.
Trustees,95 and as many assistant United States Attorneys and “Special attor-
neys”96 as the Attorney General deems necessary.97  We will hear more about
“Special attorneys” shortly.
Obviously, this list does not include all of the more than 100,000 persons
who work in the Department of Justice.98  The vast majority of federal work-
ers, including those who work at the Department of Justice, are not “officers
of the United States.”  They are employees, whose appointments are not con-
trolled by the Appointments Clause and who therefore do not require spe-
cific statutory authorization.  For their appointments, it suffices to provide, as
83 See id. § 509.  Those functions, to the extent that they are subject to delegation, are
freely delegable. See id. § 510 (“The Attorney General may from time to time make such
provisions as he considers appropriate authorizing the performance by any other officer,
employee, or agency of the Department of Justice of any function of the Attorney
General.”).
84 See id. § 504.  In the case of vacancy or disability of the Attorney General, the Deputy
Attorney General assumes the functions of the Attorney General. See id. § 508.
85 See id. § 504a.
86 See id. § 505.
87 See id. § 506.  There is also an Assistant Attorney General for Administration. See id.
§ 507.
88 See id. § 541(a).
89 See id. §§ 81–131 (establishing ninety-one judicial districts among the fifty states, the
District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico); 48 U.S.C. § 1424 (establishing the District Court of
Guam); id. § 1611 (establishing the District Court of the Virgin Islands); id. § 1821 (estab-
lishing the District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands).
90 See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351,
§ 1101, 82 Stat. 197, 236.
91 See 28 U.S.C. § 561(a).
92 See id. at § 561(c).
93 See id. at § 599A(a)(2).
94 See 18 U.S.C. § 4041 (2012).
95 See 28 U.S.C. § 581 (2012).
96 Id. § 543.
97 See id. § 542(a) (“The Attorney General may appoint one or more assistant United
States attorneys in any district when the public interest so requires.”); id. § 543(a) (“The
Attorney General may appoint attorneys to assist United States attorneys when the public
interest so requires, including the appointment of qualified tribal prosecutors and other
qualified attorneys to assist in prosecuting Federal offenses committed in Indian
country.”).
98 See Department of Justice, FEDERALPAY, https://www.federalpay.org/departments/
departmentofjustice (last visited Sept. 26, 2019) (indicating, on January 20, 2019, that the
Department of Justice has 115,583 employees).
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Congress has done, that “[e]ach Executive agency, military department, and
the government of the District of Columbia may employ such number of
employees of the various classes recognized by chapter 51 of this title as Con-
gress may appropriate for from year to year.”99  If the Department of Justice
is given a general appropriation, it can use that money to buy office supplies,
vehicles, computer equipment, or personnel, and if the appropriation is truly
general, the Department will have discretion about how many and what kind
of personnel to hire.  But it cannot use a general appropriation to create new
constitutional offices and to hire new constitutional officers.  Officer posi-
tions must be specifically “established by law.”
In 1978, the Ethics in Government Act added to the mix an “indepen-
dent counsel” appointed by a special three-judge court100 upon referral by
the Attorney General.101  The statutory provisions for the independent coun-
sel102 expired of their own force in 1999 when Congress failed to reauthorize
them.103
Shortly before the independent counsel law expired, then–Attorney
General Janet Reno promulgated regulations—effective July 1, 1999, and
which, if valid, are still in force today—providing for an “Office of Special
Counsel.”104  Under these regulations (the “Reno Regulations”), the Attor-
ney General may appoint a special counsel if proceedings in a matter by the
Department of Justice “would present a conflict of interest for the Depart-
ment or other extraordinary circumstances; and . . . under the circumstances,
it would be in the public interest to appoint an outside Special Counsel to
assume responsibility for the matter.”105  The regulations clarify that by
“outside” counsel is meant someone “from outside the United States Govern-
ment,”106 who
shall be a lawyer with a reputation for integrity and impartial decisionmak-
ing, and with appropriate experience to ensure both that the investigation
will be conducted ably, expeditiously and thoroughly, and that investigative
and prosecutorial decisions will be supported by an informed understanding
of the criminal law and Department of Justice policies.107
Thus, the Reno Regulations contemplate appointment of a special coun-
sel not currently employed by the government but, in all likelihood, having
99 5 U.S.C. § 3101 (2012).  Chapter 51 of Title 5 sets out the “General Schedule” of
classifications and pay grades for federal employees. See id. §§ 5101–15.
100 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 49, 593.
101 See id. § 592.
102 See id. §§ 591–99.
103 See id. § 599 (“This chapter shall cease to be effective five years after the date of the
enactment of the Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1994, except that this chap-
ter shall continue in effect with respect to then pending matters before an independent
counsel that in the judgment of such counsel require such continuation until that inde-
pendent counsel determines such matters have been completed.”).
104 Reno Regulations, supra note 57.
105 28 C.F.R. § 600.1 (2019) (emphasis added).
106 Id. § 600.3(a).
107 Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\95-1\NDL103.txt unknown Seq: 19 25-NOV-19 13:43
2019] why  mueller’s  appointment  was  unlawful 105
prior government experience, most likely in the Department of Justice in
some capacity, though no such prior governmental experience is legally nec-
essary for an appointment as special counsel.  The Attorney General deter-
mines the special counsel’s jurisdiction under the Reno Regulations.108
Once appointed, “the Special Counsel shall exercise, within the scope of his
or her jurisdiction, the full power and independent authority to exercise all
investigative and prosecutorial functions of any United States Attorney.”109
There are provisions in the Reno Regulations for providing staff to the spe-
cial counsel,110 for providing for review and oversight by the Attorney Gen-
eral while still ensuring that the “Special Counsel shall not be subject to the
day-to-day supervision of any official of the Department [of Justice],”111 for
removal of the special counsel by the Attorney General under carefully
defined conditions,112 and for reports by the special counsel to the Attorney
General113 and by the Attorney General to Congress.114
In sum, the Reno Regulations, as did the independent counsel statute
that preceded them, contemplate appointment, as a putative inferior officer,
of a nongovernmental official to an office that is fully the equivalent of a
United States Attorney.
United States Attorneys, of course, are created and authorized by statute.
The independent counsel from 1978 to 1999 was created and authorized by
statute.  All other officers in the Department of Justice are created and
authorized by statute.  No statute, however, creates or authorizes the special
counsel.  It is purely a creature of the 1999 Janet Reno Regulations.  But reg-
ulations are not the kind of “law” that can “establish[ ]” a federal officer.
Only a statute can do that under the Appointments Clause, and no statute
creates a special counsel with the jurisdiction and authority of Robert Muel-
ler.  Even if one believes that Congress can delegate its power to establish by
law offices to executive officials,115 no existing statute provides that authority
to create offices such as the special counsel position held by Mueller.  This
108 See id. § 600.4.
109 Id. § 600.6.
110 See id. § 600.5.
111 Id. § 600.7.
112 See id. § 600.7(d).
113 See id. § 600.8(a)(2).
114 See id. § 600.9.
115 The question whether Congress could to any extent delegate that power arose early
in the nation’s history.  The first statute for the post office authorized the postmaster to
appoint “deputy postmasters, at all places where such shall be found necessary.”  Act of
Feb. 20, 1792, ch. 7, § 3, 1 Stat. 232, 234.  There were objections on non-subdelegation
grounds to this provision, but it was defended by Representative Sedgwick, who noted the
precedent of letting the executive determine how many revenue officers to hire. See 3
ANNALS OF CONG. 238–39 (1791).  The practice continues today; Congress has specified by
statute the precise number of Assistant Attorneys General and U.S. Attorneys but not the
precise number of assistant U.S. Attorneys. See 28 U.S.C. § 542 (2012).  It is, of course,
debatable whether assistant U.S. Attorneys, or deputy postmasters, are constitutional
“Officers of the United States.”  We discuss the matter briefly infra Section III.A.
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conclusion is actually obvious upon careful examination of the relevant stat-
utes; and it ought to be a source of embarrassment to the legal community,
and particularly to the Department of Justice, that this lack of statutory
authority was not recognized sooner.
The 1999 Reno Regulations purportedly creating the office of special
counsel cite as its authority “5 U.S.C. 301; 28 U.S.C. 509, 510, 515–519.”116
In his order appointing Robert Mueller, acting Attorney General Rod Rosen-
stein cited “28 U.S.C. §§ 509, 510, and 515” as the basis of his statutory
authority to appoint a special counsel.117  These statutes, singly or collec-
tively, plainly provide no such authority, and it is astonishing that official
Department of Justice pronouncements persistently invoke them in this fash-
ion and that lower federal courts sometimes concur.
Start with 5 U.S.C. § 301.  This provision is a general authorization for
the issuance of regulations by the Attorney General or any other department
head:
The head of an Executive department or military department may pre-
scribe regulations for the government of his department, the conduct of its
employees, the distribution and performance of its business, and the cus-
tody, use, and preservation of its records, papers, and property.  This section
does not authorize withholding information from the public or limiting the
availability of records to the public.118
This is a general housekeeping provision.  Rather obviously, nothing in this
provision creates any offices or authorizes the creation (or abolition!) of any
offices.  As one district court aptly put it, “[t]his power to ‘keep house,’ how-
ever, is not the same as the power to ‘build the house’ by appointing
officers.”119  Indeed, if § 301 was taken as general authorization for appoint-
ment (or abolition!) of officers, the entirety of the more numerous specific
provisions for appointment of officers throughout the United States Code
would be superfluous.120  That is an absurd construction of § 301, and we do
not understand anyone seriously to advance it.121
116 Reno Regulations, supra note 57, at 37,042.
117 See Appointment Memo, supra note 2.
118 5 U.S.C. § 301 (2012).
119 United States v. Concord Mgmt. & Consulting LLC, 317 F. Supp. 3d 598, 622
(D.D.C. 2018).
120 See id.
121 But see Willy v. Admin. Review Bd., 423 F.3d 483, 491–92 (5th Cir. 2005) (relying on
both § 301 and a 1950 reorganization act in finding that the Secretary of Labor could
create and appoint inferior officers to an administrative review board with final decisional
authority); United States v. Janssen, 73 M.J. 221, 224–25 (C.A.A.F. 2014) (noting, and
roundly rejecting, a claim by the government that section 301 authorizes appointment of a
civilian to a military court of appeals);.  As did the court in Janssen, see Janssen, 73 M.J. at
224, we think that Willy was obviously wrong to rely, to any extent, on § 301 as authority to
appoint an officer.  Whether Willy properly relied on the applicable reorganization act,
which was specific to the Department of Labor, see Reorganization Plan No. 6 of 1950, 15
Fed. Reg. 3174, 3174 (March 13, 1950), is a matter for another time.
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Section 509 of Title 28 merely says that “[a]ll functions of other officers
of the Department of Justice and all functions of agencies and employees of
the Department of Justice are vested in the Attorney General,” except for
some functions not relevant here.122  This provision does not authorize the
creation of an office of special counsel or the appointment of private persons
to that office.  Indeed, it does not authorize the appointment of anyone to
anything.  It simply says that the Attorney General can control all of his or
her subordinates in the Justice Department or, if he or she wishes, personally
assume and exercise their responsibilities.  It does not remotely create any
office or say anything about who those subordinates might be.  We are at a
loss to imagine how the Department of Justice could ever have thought
otherwise.
Section 510 of Title 28, for its part, merely says: “The Attorney General
may from time to time make such provisions as he considers appropriate
authorizing the performance by any other officer, employee, or agency of the
Department of Justice of any function of the Attorney General.”123  This pro-
vision is also quite unremarkable and contains no explicit statutory language
creating an office or authorizing the Attorney General to appoint private per-
sons like Robert Mueller to be officers of the United States to whom the
Attorney General can delegate prosecutorial authority.  As with § 509, the
statute provides for moving authority around among the persons who are
part of the Department of Justice, but it says nothing about who those persons
are or how those persons got there.  Other statutes, as we have already seen, define
the personnel in the Department of Justice.  Sections 509 and 510 operate
once those personnel are known, but those sections say nothing about who
those personnel shall be.  The Attorney General can move his subordinate
players around the chess board, but he cannot create a new queen.
One should also note that, while § 510 seems categorical in its language
permitting delegation of the Attorney General’s functions, that language is
qualified by background constitutional and statutory understandings about
the nature of delegable authority.  Notwithstanding § 510, not everything
within the Attorney General’s power can be delegated to anyone.  Some func-
tions, for example, can only be performed by officers rather than employees.
Surely, for example, the Attorney General cannot authorize a random
“employee” of the Department of Justice to control all federal litigation or
appoint a special counsel.  Section 510 confirms the Attorney General’s
power to delegate his or her delegable functions, but it leaves to other sources
of law the determination of which functions are delegable and to whom.
The only other provision cited by acting Attorney General Rosenstein in
his Mueller appointment memo was 28 U.S.C. § 515.  Attorney General
Reno’s regulations relied on 28 U.S.C. §§ 515–19.  Again, alone or singly,
122 28 U.S.C. § 509 (2012).  The excepted functions are those functions “(1) vested by
subchapter II of chapter 5 of title 5 in administrative law judges employed by the Depart-
ment of Justice; (2) of the Federal Prison Industries, Inc.; and (3) of the Board of Directors
and officers of the Federal Prison Industries, Inc.” Id.
123 Id. § 510.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\95-1\NDL103.txt unknown Seq: 22 25-NOV-19 13:43
108 notre dame law review [vol. 95:1
none of these provisions comes close to authorizing creation of a special
counsel or the appointment by the Attorney General of a private person to
the position.
Section 515(a) confers the following power:
The Attorney General or any other officer of the Department of Justice, or
any attorney specially appointed by the Attorney General under law, may,
when specifically directed by the Attorney General, conduct any kind of legal
proceeding, civil or criminal, including grand jury proceedings and proceed-
ings before committing magistrate judges, which United States Attorneys are
authorized by law to conduct, whether or not he is a resident of the district
in which the proceeding is brought.124
Section 515(a) does not create any offices or authorize the appointment of
any new private citizen special counsels like Robert Mueller.  Section 515(a)
concerns the powers of people who have been properly appointed to offices
“under law” pursuant to other statutory provisions, and allows the Attorney Gen-
eral to designate a U.S. Attorney or a special attorney appointed “under law”
to prosecute a case “whether or not he is a resident of the district in which
the proceeding is brought.”125  Section 515(a) is thus a geographical and
jurisdictional allocative provision and not a grant of power to appoint private
citizens to be special counsels.  As we have already explained,126 in 2007, this
clause allowed the Attorney General127 to appoint, for example, Patrick Fitz-
gerald, who at the time of his appointment as special counsel was already the
appointed-under-law U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois, to
take on the germane duty of being a special counsel to investigate the Valerie
Plame affair, which arose in the District of Columbia.  Section 515(a) also
allowed, in 2012, for former Maryland United States Attorney Rod Rosen-
stein to be appointed by then–Attorney General Eric Holder to investigate
leaks in the District of Columbia.  More recently, former Attorney General
Jeff Session used Section 515(a) to ask Utah United States Attorney John
Huber to investigate alleged politicization of the FBI.  All of these United
States Attorneys were already (superior) officers of the United States, nomi-
nated by the President and confirmed by the Senate, in offices “established
by Law,” who were tasked with bringing legal proceedings outside their own
districts.  Section 515(a) permits this geographical flexibility—the ability, as we
said, of the Attorney General to move his chess pieces on the board, but not
the power to create a new queen.
Section 515 goes on to add in subsection (b):
124 Id. § 515(a).
125 Id.
126 See supra notes 15–17 and accompanying text.
127 Actually, the appointment came from Deputy Attorney General James B. Comey,
after Attorney General John Ashcroft recused himself from the matter. See Dan Eggen &
Mike Allen, Ashcroft Recuses Self from Leak Case, WASH. POST (Dec. 31, 2003), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2003/12/31/ashcroft-recuses-self-from-leak-
case/53c7218b-24e6-4b03-8759-0e134d4551fb/.
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Each Attorney specially retained under authority of the Department of Jus-
tice shall be commissioned as special assistant to the Attorney General or
special attorney, and shall take the oath required by law.  Foreign counsel
employed in special cases are not required to take the oath.  The Attorney
General shall fix the annual salary of a special assistant or special
attorney.128
One recent district court decision relied heavily, but mistakenly, on this pro-
vision in its decision upholding the validity of Mueller’s appointment, saying
that this provision authorized the hiring of new independent special counsels
of the kind contemplated in Attorney General Janet Reno’s regulations.129
The wording of § 515(b), however, refers in the past tense only to attorneys
“specially retained under the authority of the Department of Justice” to
whom it gives a title, salary, and commission.130  This is not a grant of new
power to retain or to hire new officers, but it is instead a provision that pro-
vides on its face that attorneys, who may very well be only employees and not
officers,131 and who have already been hired or retained, can also have a title
and a salary.  Section 515(b) is phrased in the past tense and refers to hires
that have already been made.  Indeed, the aforementioned district court
decision used brackets to remove the tenses from the operative verbs in
§ 515.132
To be sure, §§  515(a) and 515(b) both assume that there are going to
be attorneys “specially appointed by the Attorney General under law”133 and
“specially retained under the authority of the Department of Justice.”134  And
there is in fact an explicit provision elsewhere in Title 28 authorizing the
Attorney General to hire such persons, who can then be denominated and
commissioned as “special assistant[s]” or “special attorney[s]” under
§ 515(b).  We will come to that provision shortly.  If, as we claim, there is
such a provision that actually authorizes the appointment of special counsels,
why does the Department of Justice not rely upon it but instead cite obviously
inapplicable provisions such as § 515?  We will solve that mystery in short
order, but let us first deal with the rest of the cited but inapposite provisions.
Section 516 provides, in full: “Except as otherwise authorized by law, the
conduct of litigation in which the United States, an agency, or officer thereof
is a party, or is interested, and securing evidence therefor, is reserved to
128 28 U.S.C. § 515(b).
129 See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 315 F. Supp. 3d 602, 654–58 (D.D.C. 2018), aff’d,
916 F.3d 1047 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
130 28 U.S.C. § 515(b).
131 The requirement that such attorneys be commissioned suggests that they are
officers, as the Constitution requires that all officers be commissioned. See U.S. CONST. art.
II, § 3 (stating that the President “shall Commission all the Officers of the United States”).
All officers must be commissioned, but we do not discuss here whether all those commis-
sioned must be officers.  We do discuss the important distinction between employees and
officers shortly. See infra Section III.A.
132 See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 618.
133 28 U.S.C. § 515(a).
134 Id. § 515(b).
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officers of the Department of Justice, under the direction of the Attorney
General.”135  No office creating power here!  Section 517 provides, in full:
“The Solicitor General, or any officer of the Department of Justice, may be
sent by the Attorney General to any State or district in the United States to
attend to the interests of the United States in a suit pending in a court of the
United States, or in a court of a State, or to attend to any other interest of the
United States.”136  No office creating power here either!  Section 518 pro-
vides, in full:
(a) Except when the Attorney General in a particular case directs otherwise,
the Attorney General and the Solicitor General shall conduct and argue suits
and appeals in the Supreme Court and suits in the United States Court of
Federal Claims or in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Cir-
cuit and in the Court of International Trade in which the United States is
interested.
(b) When the Attorney General considers it in the interests of the United
States, he may personally conduct and argue any case in a court of the
United States in which the United States is interested, or he may direct the
Solicitor General or any officer of the Department of Justice to do so.137
Again, no office creating power here.  Section 519 provides, in full:
Except as otherwise authorized by law, the Attorney General shall supervise
all litigation to which the United States, an agency, or officer thereof is a
party, and shall direct all United States Attorneys, assistant United States
Attorneys, and special attorneys appointed under section 543 of this title in
the discharge of their respective duties.138
No office creating power here either.  Rather obviously, none of these provi-
sions has anything to do with the creation of or appointment to offices.
The last of these provisions, however, points the way to the correct
answer regarding the Attorney General’s statutory authority to appoint spe-
cial counsels.  Section 519 notes that there are “special attorneys appointed
under section 543 of this title.”139  Indeed there are.  Section 543 of Title 28
is explicit authority for the Attorney General to appoint special counsels.  Yet
neither the 1999 Reno Regulations nor the Rosenstein memo of May 17,
2017, appointing Robert Mueller makes any mention of this provision.  Why
not?
Because Section 543 does not authorize the kind of special counsel contem-
plated by the Reno Regulations or the Rosenstein appointment of Mueller.  Section
543 is narrowly cabined, as one would expect from the overall structure of
Title 28.  The government for decades has steadfastly refused to rely on this
provision that explicitly provides the Attorney General with hiring authority,
and it continues to refuse to rely on it in current litigation concerning special
135 Id. § 516 .
136 Id. § 517.
137 Id. § 518.
138 Id. § 519.
139 Id.
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counsels—for the obvious reason that the provision contains internal limita-
tions which the government seeks to avoid.
Section 543 of Title 28 provides:
(a) The Attorney General may appoint attorneys to assist United States
Attorneys when the public interest so requires, including the appointment
of qualified tribal prosecutors and other qualified attorneys to assist in prose-
cuting Federal offenses committed in Indian country.
(b) Each attorney appointed under this section is subject to removal by the
Attorney General.
(c) Indian Country.—In this section, the term “Indian country” has the
meaning given that term in section 1151 of title 18.140
This is an obvious and explicit authorization for the creation and appoint-
ment of special assistants or special counsels to assist U.S. Attorneys when the
public interest so requires.  There are many contexts in which the appointment
of such persons makes sense.  The government will often encounter
problems for which private lawyers have expertise—either gained from past
government service or on their own—on matters such as organized crime,
banking, antitrust, tribal law, and so forth.  Those lawyers may not want a
permanent government position but may be willing to help the government
on a limited basis, perhaps as part of a task force or a team dealing with a
specific piece of complex litigation requiring expert knowledge.  An appoint-
ment as a special assistant or special counsel, under the control and direction
of a United States Attorney, is an obvious win-win solution in many cases.
The problem for the government in the case of the 1999 Reno Regula-
tions and the Mueller appointment is that the 1999 Reno Regulations and
the Mueller appointment order of May 17, 2017, do not contemplate special
counsels who assist U.S. Attorneys; they contemplate special counsels who
replace U.S. Attorneys in specific cases.  Robert Mueller, for example, was not
appointed to assist U.S. Attorneys or to prosecute in Indian country.  He was hired
as a stand-alone officer who replaces rather than assists the functions of
United States Attorneys within the scope of his jurisdiction.  This is precisely
the role that the Ethics in Government Act explicitly authorized for indepen-
dent counsels.  But that statute no longer exists, and in the absence of that
statute or a similar provision, there is simply no statutory office of special
counsel to which Mueller could be appointed to function as a stand-in for a
U.S. Attorney.
Section 543 thus provides the hiring authority that is cross-referenced
but not created by §§ 515 and 519.  Once again, these latter provisions allow
the Attorney General of the United States to move his or her pieces in the
law enforcement chess game all over the board, but they do not give him or
her the power to create a new queen.  It takes a law to do that.  Section 543 is
such a law.  It explicitly permits special counsels.  It just does not permit the
kind of special counsel that is Robert Mueller or that is generally contem-
plated by the Reno Regulations.
140 Id. § 543.
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The remainder of Title 28 confirms this obvious conclusion.  Section
533, entitled “Investigative and Other Officials,” says:
The Attorney General may appoint officials—
(1) to detect and prosecute crimes against the United States;
(2) to assist in the protection of the person of the President; and
(3) to assist in the protection of the person of the Attorney General;
(4) to conduct such other investigations regarding official matters under the
control of the Department of Justice and the Department of State as may be
directed by the Attorney General.141
This is also an explicit authorization for appointment of persons within the
Department of Justice, but again the authorization is strictly limited and has
no bearing on the appointment of special counsels such as Robert Mueller.
Contrary to the views of a recent district court opinion142 and the court of
appeals decision that affirmed it,143  Section 533(1) is not a general authori-
zation to the Attorney General to appoint anyone and everyone.  It specifi-
cally and solely authorizes the appointment of “Investigative and Other
Officials”144—officials, not officers—connected with the FBI.  This does not
include special counsels.  We know this for three reasons.
First, § 533 is part of Chapter 33 of Title 28, encompassing §§ 531–540C,
which deals with the “Federal Bureau of Investigation.”  Section 532, which
immediately precedes § 533, is entitled “Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation,” and it spells out the Attorney General’s authority over the FBI.
Section 534, which follows § 533, is about preserving evidence in criminal
cases.  Section 533 clearly deals with FBI officials and agents, not special
counsels.  This is how the government has long understood this provision,
which has been employed as the basis for the FBI’s law enforcement author-
ity.  Not surprisingly, Rod Rosenstein in his order appointing Robert Mueller
to be special counsel did not cite § 533 as a source of authority,145 nor do the
1999 Reno Regulations refer to it.146
Second, § 533 concerns the appointment of investigative and
prosecutorial “officials.”  Such officials, as that term is used in the statute,147
are not constitutional officers of the United States and cannot perform the
functions of officers of the United States.  They are nonofficer employees,
141 Id. § 533 (footnotes omitted).
142 See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 315 F. Supp. 3d 602,652–54 (D.D.C. 2018), aff’d,
916 F.3d 1047 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
143 In re Grand Jury Investigation, 916 F.3d 1047, 1056 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
144 28 U.S.C. § 533 (emphasis added).
145 See Appointment Memo, supra note 2.
146 See Reno Regulations, supra note 57.
147 An eighteenth-century statute might well have used a term such as “officials” to have
a broader meaning than we attribute to the term in § 533. See Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct.
2044, 2056–57 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring).  As a matter of statutory interpretation,
however, there is no plausible case for reading the term as it appears in § 533 to be coex-
tensive with the constitutional meaning of “officer,” for the reasons that we give below.
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who, as FBI agents, must be subject to the supervision and direction of
officers of the United States.
As we previously noted, most of the people who work for the United
States government, including those in the FBI and other parts of the Depart-
ment of Justice, are employees rather than officers.  The distinction matters
because officers of the United States must be established by law and
appointed in conformance with the terms of the Appointments Clause.
Employees and FBI agents, by contrast, can be appointed by any means that
Congress deems “necessary and proper” for carrying out governmental func-
tions, and the hiring (purchase) of employees does not require any authority
more specific than the authority required to hire (purchase) staplers, thumb
drives, or trash cans.148  One can see the nature of § 533’s authorization by
looking at subsections (2)–(4).  Those subsections describe persons who per-
form important, and even vital, functions in the government, but they are not
the kinds of decision-making and policy-making functions that mark out
someone as a constitutional officer.  In that same company we find FBI per-
sonnel who can “detect and prosecute crimes against the United States.”149
Many people can and must participate in the investigative and prosecutorial
process without being officers of the United States.  The FBI needs office and
field personnel to perform its functions, and § 533 allows the agency to have
them.  But those office and field personnel are not officers of the United
States and do not have the range and power of a special counsel.
Further considerations show that the “officials” mentioned in § 553 are
not officers, such as special counsels.  The word “Officer” is a constitutional
term of art, not only because it is used that way in the Appointments Clause,
but also because Article II, Section 4 allows for the impeachment and
removal from office of “all civil Officers of the United States.”150  Congress
can try to impeach the Deputy Attorney General or the FBI Director, but no
one thinks Congress can impeach Department of Justice trial attorneys,
Office of Legal Counsel attorney-advisers, or lower-level officials or field per-
sonnel at the FBI.  Officials are employees.  Officers of the United States have
a duty—an officium in Latin.  Officers can be put by Congress in the line of
succession to the presidency.151  No one thinks that investigative officials at
the FBI or Department of Justice trial attorneys, who are bureaucrats and
employees, can be put in the line of succession to the presidency.  That sim-
ply is not how Congress was using the term “officials” in § 533.
Third, and perhaps most tellingly, a cavalier reading of § 533 to author-
ize hiring beyond its obvious scope obliterates the careful structure of Title
148 The district judge in In re Grand Jury Investigation did not understand this basic
point. See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 651 n.34.
149 28 U.S.C. § 533(1) (2012).
150 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
151 See id. art. II, § 1, cl. 6 (“[T]he Congress may by Law provide for the Case of
Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice President, declar-
ing what Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until
the Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.”).
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28.  Title 28 is divided into chapters dealing with the Attorney General;152
the FBI;153 U.S. Attorneys;154 the Marshals Service;155 U.S. Trustees;156 the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (§§ 599A–599B);157
and the now-sunsetted independent counsel.158  It is pellucidly clear that
wide-ranging special counsels of the sort represented by Robert Mueller are
not part of these provisions outside of the now-defunct Ethics in Government
Act sections.  At a more granular level, the effect of a loose reading of the
statutes is even more bizarre.  Congress, as we earlier saw, has provided for
the appointment, all with presidential nomination and senatorial consent, of
a Deputy Attorney General,159 an Associate Attorney General,160 a Solicitor
General,161 exactly eleven Assistant Attorneys General (plus an Assistant
Attorney General for Administration who is in the competitive service and is
appointed by the Attorney General),162 and exactly one U.S. Attorney for
each judicial district,163 of which there are currently ninety-four.  A reading
of § 533 to create essentially unlimited inferior officer appointment power in
the Attorney General wreaks havoc on this structure.
Robert Mueller performed the functions of, at a minimum, a U.S. Attor-
ney, as the Reno Regulations specifically contemplate.  If the Attorney Gen-
eral can use § 533 to appoint special counsels to replace, and not simply to
“assist,” U.S. Attorneys, he can presumably use the same provision to appoint
people to replace, and not simply assist, Assistant Attorneys General, the
Solicitor General, and the Deputy Attorney General as well.  Congress has
crafted a structure for the Department of Justice that assures that law
enforcement power is channeled through senatorially confirmed officers of
defined numbers (eleven Assistant Attorneys General and, as of the writing of
this Article, ninety-three United States Attorneys).  It makes no sense at all to
read these statutes as additionally authorizing the Attorney General alone to
then hire whomever he or she pleases to displace the functions of the statuto-
rily specified officers with persons who were not subject to senatorial confir-
mation.  That is obviously not what § 533 is about.
To be clear: the Attorney General has ample authority to hire employees
and lawyers, just as he or she has ample authority to hire other support staff
and purchase office supplies.  But those lawyers must fit within the statutory
structure prescribed by Congress, which means that any lawyers who are
152 See id. 28 U.S.C. §§ 501–530D.
153 See id. §§ 531–540C.
154 See id. §§ 541–550.
155 See id. §§ 561–575.
156 See id. §§ 581–589B.
157 See id. §§ 599A–599B.
158 See id. §§ 591–599.
159 See id. § 504.
160 See id. § 504A.
161 See id. § 505.
162 See id. § 506.
163 See id. § 541.
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officers164 must “assist” rather than replace the United States Attorneys, Assis-
tant Attorneys General, and other presidentially appointed and senatorially
confirmed officers who Congress has specifically created.  Robert Mueller was
not part of a task force run by U.S. Attorneys.  He was not assisting a U.S.
Attorney by providing special expertise in, for example, organized crime or
antitrust law.  He functioned as a freestanding officer within the Department
of Justice.  There is no statutory authorization for such a position.
B. No Statute Authorizes the Appointment of a Special Counsel with Robert
Mueller’s Range of Authority Without Presidential Nomination and
Senatorial Consent
There is an additional reason why the authorities relied upon for
decades by the government as authorization for special counsels fail to pro-
vide the necessary legal authorization for the creation of those positions.  A
special counsel under the 1999 Reno Regulations exercises all of the powers
of a U.S. Attorney.  We will demonstrate below that this makes such special
counsels superior officers who must, as a constitutional matter, be appointed
by the President and confirmed by the Senate.  But even if such special coun-
sels are not superior officers, they are, at a minimum, inferior officers.
Under the terms of the Appointments Clause, all federal officers, both supe-
rior and inferior, must be appointed by the President with the advice and
consent of the Senate unless (1) the officer in question is an inferior officer,
and (2) Congress has “by Law” specified that the officer can be appointed by
the President alone, the courts of law, or the head of a department.165  The
Appointments Clause itself thus specifies a rule of construction requiring a
clear congressional statement that any inferior federal officer’s appointment
be without presidential appointment and senatorial confirmation in order
for that to happen.166  Absent this clear specification, any officer of the
United States, however created, must be appointed by the President with the
advice and consent of the Senate.
Sound principles of constitutional structure yield this clear statement
rule, as they yield other clear statement rules.167  While one normally thinks
of the Appointments Clause as a “separation of powers” rather than a “feder-
alism” provision, it contains important elements of each.  The default rule for
officer appointments does not require confirmation by Congress as a whole.
It requires confirmation by the Senate.  The Senate is the preserve of the
164 If a lawyer is not an officer, the hiring of that person stands on no different footing
than does the hiring of a filing clerk or janitorial staff.  There is both a statutory and a
constitutional difference between the hiring of employees and the hiring of officers.  But,
of course, if the lawyer is not an officer, that person cannot possibly exercise the range of
authority exercised by a special counsel. See infra Section III.A.
165 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
166 See United States v. Maurice, 26 F. Cas. 1211, 1214 (C.C.D. Va. 1823) (No. 15,747).
167 See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460–61, 469–70 (1991) (describing a
clear statement rule for construing federal statutes that interfere with state governmental
authority).
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smaller states, who are each guaranteed representation in equal number to
the larger states.  The Senate’s confirmation role thus assures the smaller
states a say in the vital questions of executive staffing.  If left only to presiden-
tial discretion, large-state Presidents (and the Electoral College favors large-
state Presidents) might underrepresent the smaller states in the executive
departments—a possibility of which the framing generation was acutely
aware.  As one Convention participant put it, unchecked presidential
appointment “would put it in his power to gain over the larger States, by
gratifying them with a preference of their Citizens.”168  These constitutional
concerns warrant an interpretative presumption in favor of a clear statement
of congressional intent to authorize appointment of an inferior officer by any
means other than presidential nomination and senatorial consent.  The con-
stitutional structure and the prerogatives of the Senate both demand it.
Congress knows how to overcome that presumption.  When Congress
chooses to “by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they
think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of
Departments,” it uses explicit statutory language in doing so, as we made
clear in the Introduction to this article.169
Consider also in this regard 28 U.S.C. § 546(d), which governs the
power to appoint interim U.S. Attorneys as inferior officers170: “If an appoint-
ment expires under subsection (c)(2), the district court for such district may
appoint a United States Attorney to serve until the vacancy is filled. The
order of appointment by the court shall be filed with the clerk of the
court.”171  This is clear statutory language that a federal district judge, one of
the constitutional “Courts of Law,” “may appoint” inferior officers.
Similarly, 28 U.S.C. § 593(b)—part of the Ethics in Government Act of
1978, which sunsetted out of existence in 1999—provided that a special
three-judge court appointed by the Chief Justice of the United States, when
the Attorney General referred a case to it, could appoint inferior officers.
The statute said that upon receiving an application from the Attorney Gen-
eral, the court, which the Act called a special division, “shall appoint an
appropriate independent counsel and shall define that independent coun-
sel’s prosecutorial jurisdiction.”172  Once again, we see clear statutory lan-
guage saying that the three-federal-judge special division “shall appoint” an
168 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 72, at 43 (statement of Mr.
Bedford).
169 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
170 The statute, of course, assumes that interim U.S. Attorneys are inferior rather than
superior officers.  As a matter of constitutional law, we doubt this conclusion. See infra
subsection III.B.2.  But for purposes of illustrating Congress’s use of express language
authorizing appointment by means other than presidential nomination and senatorial con-
sent, it does not matter whether Congress’s constitutional judgment about the status of
interim U.S. Attorneys was correct.
171 28 U.S.C. § 546(d) (2012).
172 Id. § 593(b)(1).
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independent counsel, who was deemed an inferior officer by the Supreme
Court in Morrison v. Olson.173
And, as we mentioned in the Introduction, the organic statutes of the
Departments of Agriculture, Education, Health and Human Services, and
Transportation all contain clear officer-appointment-granting clauses.  Thus,
the Agriculture Secretary “may appoint such officers and employees . . . and
such experts, as are necessary to execute the functions vested in him.”174
The Education Secretary “is authorized to appoint and fix the compensation
of such officers and employees, including attorneys, as may be necessary to
carry out the functions of the Secretary and the Department.”175  The Health
and Human Services Secretary “is authorized to appoint and fix the compen-
sation of such officers and employees.”176  The Transportation Secretary
“may appoint and fix the pay of officers and employees of the Department of
Transportation.”177  The Administrative Procedure Act, for its part, says
“[e]ach agency shall appoint as many administrative law judges as are neces-
sary for [hearing and deciding cases.]”178
There is no such clear language in the existing statutes for the Depart-
ment of Justice relied upon by the government in the Reno Regulations and
Mueller appointment memo.  The only relevant language is in §§ 515, 533,
and 543, and we have already seen that the former two provisions simply do
not create any hiring authority while the latter does not authorize the kind of
special counsel created by the Reno Regulations.  None of these provisions
specifically gives the Attorney General power to appoint officers.  That is
especially significant because there is in fact one provision pertaining to the
Department of Justice that does specifically give the Attorney General a
broad-based power to appoint officers.  The statutory provision for the Direc-
tor of the Bureau of Prisons reads: “The Bureau of Prisons shall be in charge
of a director appointed by and serving directly under the Attorney General.
The Attorney General may appoint such additional officers and employees as
he deems necessary.”179  Thus, the Attorney General has specific, explicit
authority to hire officers for the Bureau of Prisons—but not elsewhere.
The Appointments Clause creates a default rule that all officers of the
United States, whether inferior or superior, must be nominated by the Presi-
dent and confirmed by the Senate.  It takes affirmative action through pas-
sage of a statute for Congress to vest in the Attorney General the power to
appoint an inferior officer to be a special counsel.  Since Congress has never
passed such a statute, Robert Mueller could not have been appointed by any
means other than presidential nomination and senatorial consent even if he
was an inferior rather than a superior officer.
173 See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 671 n.12 (1988).
174 7 U.S.C. § 610(a) (2012).
175 20 U.S.C. § 3461(a) (2012).
176 42 U.S.C. § 913 (2012).
177 49 U.S.C. § 323(a) (2012).
178 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (2012).
179 18 U.S.C. § 4041 (2012) (emphasis added).
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Because the statutes invoked by the Department of Justice do not actu-
ally authorize the creation and appointment of special counsels, they natu-
rally contain no limits on such a (fictitious) power.  The power that the
Department of Justice claims in the 1999 Reno Regulations is not cabined by
law because it is not rooted in law.  It could lead to an Attorney General
appointing inferior officer special counsels in states with senators of the
opposite political party from the White House.  It could lead to appointment
of an inferior officer shadow of the Solicitor General or of the Assistant Attor-
ney General of the Criminal Division.  Through its regulations and its
appointment of Mueller, the Department of Justice is claiming that it has
absolute power to appoint inferior officer special counsels—and, as Lord
Acton said, “absolute power corrupts absolutely.”180  There is no chance at all
that either the careful structure of Title 28 or the Constitution permits this
extravagance.
All of this suggests the wisdom of reading the statutes that Congress has
enacted to mean exactly what they say.  There is no freewheeling power in
the Attorney General to appoint private persons like Robert Mueller to infer-
ior officer status.  Acting Attorney General Rosenstein should have, instead of
appointing Robert Mueller to investigate the alleged collusion-with-Russia
scandal, appointed one of the Senate-confirmed United States Attorneys to
take on that job in addition to pursuing their other duties.  Robert Mueller
could then “assist” that United States Attorney if such was deemed necessary.
That is the road not taken, but it is the only road that the law permits.
C. Our Reading of the Statutes Is Consistent with the Watergate Tapes Case
At least one district judge agrees wholly with our statutory analysis, con-
cluding that the various provisions cited by the government, alone or in com-
bination, “ ‘do not explicitly authorize’ the Acting Attorney General to
appoint a Special Counsel.”181  The court specifically rejects the idea that
either § 515(b) or § 533 can provide the necessary authorization, essentially
for the reasons that we have provided here.182  The court nonetheless
upheld the appointment of Robert Mueller as special counsel on the ground
that binding precedent, however faultily reasoned, already settled the matter.
In particular, the court believed that the Supreme Court’s decision in United
States v. Nixon,183 the Watergate Tapes case, which granted Special Counsel
Leon Jaworski’s request for a subpoena of Richard Nixon’s tapes, implicitly
assumed that Leon Jaworski was legally appointed even though that issue was
180 Letter from Lord Acton to Archbishop Mandell Creighton (Apr. 5, 1887), reprinted
in 1 LECTURES ON MODERN HISTORY (John Neville Figgis & Reginald Vere Laurence eds.,
1906), http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/acton-acton-creighton-correspondence#lf1524_
label_010.
181 United States v. Concord Mgmt. & Consulting LLC, 317 F. Supp. 3d 598, 618
(D.D.C. 2018) (quoting In re Sealed Case, 829 F.2d 50, 55 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
182 See id. at 618–20 (rejecting § 533 as a source of authority to hire special counsels);
id. at 620–21 (rejecting § 515(b) as a source of authority to hire special counsels).
183 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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never raised, briefed, argued, or decided in United States v. Nixon.  Similar
reliance was placed on the D.C. Circuit’s decision in In re Sealed Case,184
which concerned the appointment of an Iran-Contra special counsel.  The
District Court thus held:
Even though the statutes “do not explicitly authorize” the Acting Attor-
ney General to appoint the Special Counsel, Nixon and Sealed Case estab-
lish that the statutory provisions “accommodat[e] the delegation at issue.”
In re Sealed Case, 829 F.2d at 55.  Both cases involved similar officers: special
prosecutors appointed via Department of Justice regulations.  In both, the
Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit stated that Congress empowered the
Attorney General to appoint the officers, albeit without analyzing specifically
how any individual provision or combination of provisions accomplished
this.185
Another district court, whose independent statutory reasoning was not
nearly as careful as that of the judge in Concord Management, also relied heav-
ily on United States v. Nixon as recognizing statutory authority to appoint a
special counsel with broad powers.186  In affirming that decision, the D.C.
Circuit went even further: “Because binding precedent establishes that Con-
gress has ‘by law’ vested authority in the Attorney General to appoint the
special counsel as an inferior officer, this court has no need to go further to
identify the specific sources of this authority.”187  And indeed the court made no
effort to identify any such sources of authority.188  All of these courts are
mistaken.  Even if one believes that court decisions establish law superior to
statutes, neither Nixon nor In re Sealed Case can carry the weight of sustaining
the 1999 Reno Regulations or the creation of Robert Mueller’s office and his
appointment to it.
Here is the entire discussion (sans unhelpful footnotes) of the relevant
statutes from the opinion in United States v. Nixon:
Our starting point is the nature of the proceeding for which the evi-
dence is sought—here a pending criminal prosecution.  It is a judicial pro-
ceeding in a federal court alleging violation of federal laws and is brought in
the name of the United States as sovereign. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S.
78, 88 (1935).  Under the authority of Art. II, § 2, Congress has vested in the
Attorney General the power to conduct the criminal litigation of the United
States Government.  28 U.S.C. § 516.  It has also vested in him the power to
184 829 F.2d 50.
185 Concord Mgmt. & Consulting, 317 F. Supp. 3d at 622 (citation omitted).
186 See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 315 F. Supp. 3d 602, 652 (D.D.C. 2018), aff’d, 916
F.3d 1047 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
187 In re Grand Jury Investigation, 916 F.3d at 1054 (emphasis added).
188 The D.C. Circuit did not address whether the Constitution requires a “clear state-
ment” rule for appointment of special counsels without presidential nomination and sena-
torial confirmation, because “Miller’s cursory references to a ‘clear statement’ argument
he presented to the district court are insufficient to preserve that issue for appeal and it is
forfeited.” Id.  In light of the arguments actually presented in that case, we find this con-
clusion somewhere between puzzling and inexplicable, but the point is incidental to our
analysis.
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appoint subordinate officers to assist him in the discharge of his duties.  28
U.S.C. §§ 509, 510, 515, 533.  Acting pursuant to those statutes, the Attorney
General has delegated the authority to represent the United States in these
particular matters to a Special Prosecutor with unique authority and tenure.
The regulation gives the Special Prosecutor explicit power to contest the
invocation of executive privilege in the process of seeking evidence deemed
relevant to the performance of these specially delegated duties.  38 Fed. Reg.
30739, as amended by 38 Fed. Reg. 32805.189
For three reasons, this discussion does not remotely settle the legality of the
Reno Regulations or Robert Mueller’s appointment.
First, and most importantly, the discussion is pure dictum.  As one dis-
trict judge recently recognized, “no party in Nixon had disputed that Con-
gress had authorized the Attorney General to appoint the Watergate Special
Prosecutor.”190  This judge and the judge in Concord Management, however,
both maintained that this discussion was nonetheless “necessary to the
Court’s conclusion that a justiciable controversy existed,”191 and was a “nec-
essary step[ ]”192 in the Court’s reasoning.  The D.C. Circuit said much the
same thing:
The Supreme Court held there was a justiciable controversy because the reg-
ulations issued by the Attorney General gave the Special Prosecutor author-
ity to contest the President’s invocation of executive privilege during the
investigation.  In this analysis, the Attorney General’s statutory authority to
issue the regulations was a necessary antecedent to determining whether the
regulations were valid, and, therefore, was necessary to the decision that a
justiciable controversy existed.193
That is simply wrong.  It fundamentally misunderstands what was at issue in
United States v. Nixon.
The issue in Nixon was whether the President’s assertion of executive
privilege could be challenged in court by an official—really any official—in
the Department of Justice.  President Nixon maintained that because the
President ultimately controls both law enforcement and the assertion of exec-
utive privilege, and the President had not delegated to anyone responsibility
to determine the propriety of claims of executive privilege, disagreements
between the President and subordinate law enforcement officials about what
matters were covered by executive privilege did not present a justiciable con-
troversy but were simply intradepartmental disputes beyond the cognizance
of the courts.194  This is purely a constitutional issue involving the so-called
189 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 694–95 (1974) (footnotes omitted).
190 In re Grand Jury Investigation, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 652.
191 Id.
192 United States v. Concord Mgmt. & Consulting LLC, 317 F. Supp. 3d 598, 623
(D.D.C. 2018).
193 In re Grand Jury Investigation, 916 F.3d at 1053 (citation omitted).
194 See Brief for the Respondent, Cross-Petitioner at 28–29, United States v. Nixon, 418
U.S. 683 (1974) (Nos. 73-1766, 73-1834) (“The ultimate authority over all executive branch
decisions is, under Article II of the Constitution, vested exclusively in the President of the
United States.  The President has neither waived nor delegated to the Special Prosecutor
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“unitary executive.”  It does not remotely embrace the statutory status of the
special counsel, which is completely irrelevant to the point under discussion.
The argument in the Nixon Tapes case would be exactly the same if the
Attorney General—or the Deputy Attorney General, or the Solicitor General,
or a U.S. Attorney—rather than the special counsel was contesting a presi-
dential assertion of executive privilege.  The identity or status of the Depart-
ment of Justice official does not matter at all.  The only nonconstitutional
question was whether the President had, as a matter of fact, delegated
authority over executive privilege decisions to anyone else (assuming, as a
constitutional matter, that such a delegation is permissible).  As the President
explained in his brief:
[T]he President has not in the past nor does he here challenge those powers
that were given to the Special Prosecutor in Watergate-related matters,
including the right to conduct grand jury and other investigations, review
documentary evidence available, and determine within the confines of the
Constitution whom to prosecute and on what charges.  Moreover, all deci-
sions relating to the procedural aspects of prosecution including the right to
request immunity for any witness are within the scope of his authority.  In
these and other areas delegated to him, the Special Prosecutor has had and
continues to have complete independence.
However, . . . the President has neither waived nor delegated to the
Special Prosecutor the President’s duty to claim privilege as to all materials,
confidential in nature, which fall within the President’s inherent authority to
refuse to disclose to any executive officer.  Nor did Acting Attorney General
Bork attempt to delegate such authority to the Special Prosecutor.  On the
contrary, the authority granted to the Special Prosecutor by then Acting
Attorney General Bork in this regard was specifically limited to at most:
“determin[ing] whether or not to contest the assertion of executive privilege
or any other testimonial privilege.”  38 Fed. Reg. 30,739 (1973).
From this provision, it is abundantly clear that the President has not
waived or delegated to the Special Prosecutor his duty to determine within
his discretion what executive materials were privileged.  Since this decision
was retained by the President and falls within the normal scope of his
prosecutorial discretion over all criminal cases, the courts are powerless to
intervene, even at the request of the Special Prosecutor.195
his duty to determine what confidential presidential documents shall be made available to
another executive officer.”); id. at 41 (“[I]f it is solely an executive decision to prosecute, it
follows that the courts are equally powerless to determine what material within the execu-
tive branch must be used in the case.  Such a decision is exclusively within the power dele-
gated by the Constitution to the Chief Executive . . . .”); id. at 41–42 (“[T]he President has
not delegated to the Special Prosecutor or any subordinate official, [sic] his duty to deter-
mine the privileged nature and use of executive material.  Therefore, the district court
plainly erred in asserting that it had jurisdiction to intervene in this suit on the ground that
the President was abridging the independence of the Special Prosecutor over matters that
were delegated to him.  Moreover, it is unnecessary for this Court to speculate on the
jurisdictional basis for this suit if the President, had, in fact, delegated his right and respon-
sibilities concerning executive materials to the Special Prosecutor.”).
195 Id. at 42–43 (footnote omitted).
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This understanding of the issues in Nixon is confirmed by the govern-
ment’s brief defending the justiciability of the case.  The government dis-
puted Nixon’s key constitutional “unitary executive” premise of presidential
control over law enforcement, maintaining instead that “Congress has vested
in the Attorney General, as the head of the Department of Justice, the exclu-
sive authority to conduct the government’s civil and criminal litigation,
including the exclusive authority for securing evidence.”196  Thus, the issue
presented in Nixon involved the relationship between the President and the
Department of Justice as an institution, not the relationship between the Presi-
dent and the special counsel.  Because the point is so crucial, and because we
want there to be no chance that we are misrepresenting the nature or con-
text of the dispute in Nixon, we present the government’s argument at
length:
We begin by making the fundamental point, overlooked by counsel for
the President, that federal criminal prosecutions are brought in the name of
the United States of America as a sovereign nation.  Despite his extensive
powers and even his status as Chief Executive and Chief of State, the Presi-
dent, whether in his personal capacity or his official capacity, is distinct from
the United States and is decidedly not the sovereign.  Although the Constitu-
tion vests the executive power generally in the President (Art. II, Sec. 1), it
expressly contemplates the establishment of executive departments which
will actually discharge the executive power, with the President’s function
necessarily limited to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed” by
other officers of the government (Art. II, Sec. 3).  Thus, Article II, Section 2
expressly provides that, instead of giving the President power to appoint
(and, perhaps, remove) “inferior Officers” of the Executive Branch, “Con-
gress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they
think proper, . . . in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.”
Congress has organized the Department of Justice and provided that
the Attorney General is its head.  28 U.S.C. 501, 503.  Under Article II, Sec-
tion 2, Congress has vested in him alone the power to appoint subordinate
officers to discharge his powers.  28 U.S.C. 509, 510, 515, 533.  Among the
responsibilities given by Congress to the Attorney General is the authority to
conduct the government’s civil and criminal litigation (28 U.S.C. 516):
Except as otherwise authorized by law, the conduct of litigation in which
the United States, an agency, or officer thereof is a party, or is interested,
and securing evidence therefor, is reserved to officers of the Department of
Justice, under the direction of the Attorney General. (Emphasis added.)
As this Court has recognized, this section and companion provisions,
see 28 U.S.C. 515–519, “impose on the Attorney General the authority and
the duty to protect the Government’s interests through the courts.” United
States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 27–28.  Under this framework it is not the
President who has personal charge of the conduct of the government’s
affairs in court but, rather, it is the Attorney General acting through the
officers of the Department of Justice appointed by him.  This Court under-
196 Brief for the United States at 17, United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (Nos.
73-1766, 73-1834).
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scored the special status of the officers of the Department of Justice before
the courts in Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, explaining that the fed-
eral prosecutor “is the representative not of an ordinary party to a contro-
versy, but of a sovereignty. . . . As such, he is in a peculiar and a very definite
sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not
escape or innocence suffer.”
Thus, as the district judge below pointedly recognized (Pet. App. 19),
the subpoena duces tecum issued by the prosecution to the President is
directed to a person who “as a practical matter, is a third party.”
It was in the capacity as attorney for the United States that the Special
Prosecutor invoked the judicial process.  Exercising his exclusive authority
under 28 U.S.C. 516 to secure evidence for a pending criminal prosecution
within his jurisdiction, the Special Prosecutor is seeking evidence from an
adverse party-evidence which the Special Prosecutor has reason to believe is
highly material to the trial.  Under the law, the Special Prosecutor speaks for
the United States in conducting this criminal trial, and under the applicable
statutes and regulations he has authority, which can be enforced by the
courts, to seek evidence even from the President.  Not only is this authority
expressly included in the Department of Justice regulations defining his
powers (Appendix pp. 146 50, infra), but the record shows that the Presi-
dent personally acceded to the arrangement whereby his assertion of privi-
lege would not preclude the Special Prosecutor, in a proper case, from
invoking the judicial process to litigate the validity of the claim.197
The accident that it was a special prosecutor rather than a U.S. Attorney or
the Attorney General personally who was challenging the President’s author-
ity was entirely irrelevant to the jurisdictional issue before the Court in the
Nixon Tapes case.  Far from a “necessary” step in the Nixon Court’s reason-
ing, the discussion of the special prosecutor’s appointment was merely
unnecessary (and unhelpful) background.
Second, as dictum, the discussion in Nixon is unpersuasive in the
extreme.  The Court in Nixon did not examine or even quote the texts of 28
U.S.C. §§ 509, 510, 515, and 533, nor did it compare them to other statutes
on the books in 1973 by which Congress vested in other entities like the
Department of Agriculture, Education, Health and Human Services, or
Transportation the power to appoint inferior officers.198  The Court in Nixon
did not take notice of the fact that 28 U.S.C. § 515(b) refers to employees
already “retained” rather than granting a new power to retain inferior
officers, nor did it focus on the fact that 28 U.S.C. § 533 is embedded in the
statutes setting up the FBI and refers to prosecutorial and investigative offi-
cials, meaning by that term FBI agents and not special counsels who are
officers.  The Court made no reference at all to 28 U.S.C. § 543, which is the
provision that specifically authorizes the (limited) creation and appointment
of special counsels but only to assist United States Attorneys as subordinates.
Nor did the Court examine the structure of Title 28.  Indeed, the Court did
197 Id. at 27–30 (omission in original).
198 We make such a comparison supra, at text accompanying notes 174–78.
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not examine anything at all, which is not surprising, since no party in the case
asked it to do so.  It is actually very hard to find dicta of less relevance than
Nixon’s throwaway reference to the statutes purportedly authorizing Depart-
ment of Justice appointments.  The D.C. Circuit’s backhanded suggestion
that the language in Nixon regarding the statutory scheme for the Depart-
ment of Justice was “carefully considered language”199 would perhaps be
amusing if the rule of law were a laughing matter.
Third, Nixon was written at a time when the Supreme Court’s attention
to separation of powers and other structural niceties was at its lowest ebb.
Since 1974, the Supreme Court’s Appointments Clause caselaw has been
transformed, most notably by Buckley v. Valeo.200  Between 1936 and 1976, the
Supreme Court treated the Appointments Clause, as it did other separation
of powers provisions, like a dead letter in constitutional law, in much the way
it did with the Commerce Clause prior to United States v. Lopez.201  This is why
the en banc D.C. Circuit in Buckley v. Valeo202 upheld the constitutionality of
a statute which said that two members of the Federal Election Commission
would be appointed by the President with the approval of the entire Con-
gress, another two members would be appointed by the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, and the final two members would be appointed by
the President Pro Tempore of the Senate.203  This statute was blatantly
unconstitutional under the Appointments Clause of Article II—as blatantly
unconstitutional as a statute prescribing that California will henceforth have
five senators—but a majority of the D.C. Circuit thought it needed to wait for
a riper controversy in order to make that obvious judgment.204  The court
dismissed references to the text of the Appointments Clause as “strikingly
syllogistic.”205  This cavalier treatment of constitutional and statutory texts in
separation of powers cases characterized the attitude of the federal courts for
four decades following the New Deal.
Since the rebirth of the Appointments Clause in 1976, the Supreme
Court has decided a number of additional Appointments Clause cases includ-
ing: Morrison v. Olson,206 Freytag v. Commissioner,207 Weiss v. United States,208
199 In re Grand Jury Investigation, 916 F.3d 1047, 1053 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (quoting
United States v. Fields, 699 F.3d 518, 522 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
200 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
201 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
202 519 F.2d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc) (per curiam).
203 See 2 U.S.C. § 437c(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1975).
204 See Buckley, 519 F.2d at 890–93.  Judge MacKinnon thought it obvious that the
appointment process for the FEC was unconstitutional. See id. at 926–33 (MacKinnon, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
205 Id. at 889 (majority opinion).  Some of us were under the impression that syllogisms
are generally strong arguments.
206 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
207 501 U.S. 868 (1991).
208 510 U.S. 163 (1994).
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Edmond v. United States,209 Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB,210 and Lucia v.
SEC.211  The Court today looks at Appointments Clause cases and at issues of
governmental structure, notably issues of the internal organization of the
executive department, through a very different lens than it did forty-five years
ago.  Throwaway dicta from the bygone era pre-1976 should have no weight
at all.  Moreover, the current Supreme Court often relies on clear statement
rules in structural constitutional law cases.
United States v. Nixon remains precedential caselaw on the justiciability of
internal executive department disputes and on the limited scope of executive
privilege claims by the President in criminal proceedings against him or her.
But to the extent that one regards it as ruling on the legality of Leon Jawor-
ski’s appointment (which, as we have seen, it did not), its discussion does not
remain good law after the Supreme Court’s subsequent careful Appoint-
ments Clause decisions in Buckley v. Valeo, in 1976, up through Lucia v. SEC,
in 2018.  Structure matters today in a way that it did not seem to matter in
1974.
The district courts and D.C. Circuit panel that have addressed this issue
recently have been bound by precedent from the D.C. Circuit.  One such
district court considered itself bound to uphold the appointment of Robert
Mueller because of In re Sealed Case,212 which involved Special Counsel Law-
rence Walsh’s prosecution of Oliver North in the wake of the Iran-Contra
controversy in the mid-1980s.  The D.C. Circuit subsequently took the same
view.213 In re Sealed Case, however, is even less pertinent—if that is possible—
to the validity of the Reno Regulations and Mueller’s appointment than is
United States v. Nixon.  The validity of the special counsel’s appointment was
not raised at all in that case.
The judge in Concord Management asserted that the issue of statutory
authority to hire Special Counsel Lawrence Walsh was raised by Oliver North
“at least at a high level of generality”214 and was therefore resolved by the
D.C. Circuit when that court said in 1987, with no analysis or discussion:
We have no difficulty concluding that the Attorney General possessed
the statutory authority to create the Office of Independent Counsel: Iran/
Contra and to convey to it the “investigative and prosecutorial functions and
powers” described in 28 C.F.R. § 600.1(a) of the regulation.  The statutory
provisions relied upon by the Attorney General in promulgating the regula-
tion are 5 U.S.C. § 301 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 509, 510, and 515.  While these
provisions do not explicitly authorize the Attorney General to create an
Office of Independent Counsel virtually free of ongoing supervision, we
read them as accommodating the delegation at issue here.215
209 520 U.S. 651 (1997).
210 561 U.S. 477 (2010).
211 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018).
212 829 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
213 See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 916 F.3d 1047, 1053–54 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
214 United States v. Concord Mgmt. & Consulting LLC, 317 F.Supp.3d 598, 623 (D.D.C.
2018).
215 In re Sealed Case, 829 F.2d 50, 55 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (footnotes omitted).
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The D.C. Circuit in 2019 said of this discussion:
The issue before the court [in In re Sealed Case] was whether the inde-
pendent counsel was authorized to investigate and to prosecute officials in
regard to the Iran/Contra matter.  As such, the Attorney General’s authority
to appoint an independent counsel was antecedent to deciding whether the
Attorney General validly delegated authority to the independent counsel.
The court’s quoted statements regarding the Attorney General’s statutory
authority to appoint an independent counsel are, therefore, not
dicta . . . .216
Oliver North’s only challenge to the statutory authority of the Attorney
General to hire Lawrence Walsh stemmed from a “preemption” argument:
North claimed that the provisions of the Ethics in Government Act were the
exclusive basis for hiring a special counsel and thus foreclosed any parallel
authority under other statutes in Title 28 once the Ethics in Government Act
provisions were employed.217  Absent the provision in 28 U.S.C. § 597(a),
which said that
[w]henever a matter is in the prosecutorial jurisdiction of an independent
counsel or has been accepted by an independent counsel under section
594(e), the Department of Justice, the Attorney General, and all other
officers and employees of the Department of Justice shall suspend all investi-
gations and proceedings regarding such matter, except to the extent
required by section 594(d)(1), and except insofar as such independent
counsel agrees in writing that such investigation or proceedings may be con-
tinued by the Department of Justice,218
North said that he would have no objection to the Attorney General’s statu-
tory authority: “[A]s long as the [Ethics] Act remains in force, . . . the Attorney
General ha[s] no independent authority” to act in this matter,219 and “the
regulation [creating the Office of Special Counsel] might provide a source of
authority if and when the Ethics Act is ruled unconstitutional.”220  North’s
other statutory arguments ran to whether the Office of Special Counsel could
be located outside the Department of Justice,221 which is obviously not perti-
nent to the issues that we raise here, and whether the hiring of associate coun-
sels for the special counsel had followed the appropriate procedures under 28
U.S.C. § 515 for commissioning lawyers.222
We urge anyone genuinely interested in this question (and one might
have hoped that the D.C. Circuit panel hearing In re Grand Jury Investigation
would fall into this category) to read in full the brief and reply brief of Colo-
nel North in In re Sealed Case.  It is obvious from those documents that the
only statutory challenge to Special Counsel Walsh’s appointment, as opposed
216 In re Grand Jury Investigation, 916 F.3d at 1054.
217 See Brief of Appellant at 13–21, In re Sealed Case, 829 F.2d 50 (No. 87-5247).
218 28 U.S.C. § 597(a) (2012).
219 See Brief of Appellant, supra note 217, at 20 (emphasis added).
220 Id. at 35.
221 See Reply Brief of Appellant at 43–54, In re Sealed Case, 829 F.2d 50 (No. 87-5247).
222 See Brief of Appellant, supra note 217, at 21–33.
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to the location of Special Counsel Walsh’s authority outside the Department
of Justice, was based on § 597(a).  As for why the D.C. Circuit in In re Sealed
Case would have chosen to opine, in unexplained dicta, on a matter not
presented by the case—we leave that speculation to others.
In sum, the statutes purportedly authorizing Mueller to act as special
counsel do no such thing, and no appellate case prior to 2019 holds
otherwise.
III. THE CONSTITUTION DOES NOT PERMIT APPOINTMENT AS AN INFERIOR
OFFICER OF A SPECIAL COUNSEL WITH ROBERT MUELLER’S SCOPE
OF AUTHORITY
Even if there was statutory authority for the appointment of special
counsels who replace rather than assist U.S. Attorneys, the 1999 Reno Regu-
lations and the creation of Mueller’s office and his appointment to it would
still be invalid.  The Constitution requires that all noninferior “Officers of the
United States” be appointed through presidential nomination and senatorial
confirmation.  The 1999 Reno Regulations contemplate the creation of spe-
cial counsels appointed by the Attorney General.223  That is a constitutionally
permissible form of appointment for inferior officers if Congress so directs, as
inferior officers may be appointed by the President alone, the courts of law,
or department heads if Congress so provides “by Law.”224  We have shown in
Part II, however, that the relevant statutes for the Department of Justice do
not contain any such congressional direction.  But even if they did contain
such authorizations, the special counsels contemplated by the Reno Regula-
tions are not inferior officers.  They are supercharged U.S. Attorneys.  Robert
Mueller, in particular, was most emphatically not an inferior officer as he
claimed to be, and he therefore needed to be either an employee of the
Justice Department (in which case he could not exercise most of his func-
tions) or a superior officer appointed by the President with the advice and
consent of the Senate, in the same way that Patrick Fitzgerald was appointed
as special counsel.
The constitutionally proper form of appointment for a special counsel is
clear as a matter of original meaning.  The inferiority of an officer under the
Constitution is a function both of the officer’s location in a decision-making
hierarchy and of the officer’s scope of authority.  An officer whose decision is
hierarchically final within the executive department (apart from the omni-
present possibility of presidential review) cannot be inferior regardless of the
nature and character of the officer’s authority.  But even an officer whose
decision is subject to review by another officer can still be noninferior if the
officer’s authority is sufficiently broad.  Special counsels under the 1999
Reno Regulations exercise the full power of U.S. Attorneys, and U.S. Attor-
neys have broad enough authority to preclude them from being inferior
officers.
223 See Reno Regulations, supra note 57.
224 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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Moreover, even under the Supreme Court’s faulty reasoning in Morrison
v. Olson, which considers a multitude of factors in distinguishing inferior
from noninferior officers,225 Robert Mueller was not an inferior officer.  The
nature and scope of his authority differed in important ways from the nature
and scope of the authority of independent counsel Alexia Morrison, whose
appointment as an inferior officer was (we think wrongly) upheld in Morri-
son.226  Furthermore, some lower courts have wildly overread the Supreme
Court’s decision in Edmond v. United States227 to establish a rule that any
degree of internal executive department supervision is enough to make an
officer inferior.  That is a position so absurd that no honest reader could
possibly attribute it to Justice Scalia’s opinion in Edmond.  Whether viewed
from the standpoint of constitutional meaning or caselaw, Robert Mueller’s
appointment by the (acting) Attorney General was constitutionally defective.
We show in Section III.A below that Robert Mueller was not an employee
and in Section III.B below that he was not, as he needed to be, properly
appointed as a superior officer.
A. Robert Mueller Was an Officer of the United States and Not an Employee
We have thus far taken for granted that special counsels appointed
under the Reno Regulations, and Robert Mueller in particular, are “Officers
of the United States” for purposes of the Appointments Clause.  If that
assumption is false, and special counsels are not officers, then the only legal
questions about their appointments are statutory.  As Justice Kagan aptly put
it, if government workers are “part of the broad swath of ‘lesser functionaries’
in the Government’s workforce . . . , the Appointments Clause cares not a
whit about who named them.”228  The Department of Justice since 1999 has
proceeded on the assumption that special counsels are constitutional
officers, and it (rightly) does not contest Robert Mueller’s officer status in
any of the cases that challenge his authority to act.229  Nonetheless, it is
worth taking a moment to clarify how and why special counsels are officers,
as it will set the context for the decidedly contested question whether they
are inferior or noninferior officers.
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of who is an officer of the
United States rather than merely an employee in Buckley v. Valeo,230 where it
held that members of the Federal Election Commission, who were clearly not
appointed in conformance with the Appointments Clause,231 could “prop-
erly perform duties only in aid of those functions that Congress may carry out
225 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
226 See id. at 696–97.
227 520 U.S. 651 (1997).
228 Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2051 (2018) (citation omitted).
229 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation, 315 F. Supp. 3d 602, 626 n.10 (D.D.C. 2018)
(“The Special Counsel does not dispute that he is an officer of the United States.”), aff’d,
916 F.3d 1047 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
230 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
231 See id. at 126–27.
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by itself, or in an area sufficiently removed from the administration and
enforcement of the public law as to permit their being performed by persons
not ‘Officers of the United States.’”232  Thus, explained the Court, “provi-
sions of the [Federal Election Campaign] Act [of 1971], vesting in the Com-
mission primary responsibility for conducting civil litigation in the courts of
the United States for vindicating public rights, violate Art. II, § 2, cl. 2, of the
Constitution.  Such functions may be discharged only by persons who are
‘Officers of the United States’ within the language of that section.”233
Buckley v. Valeo thus makes crystal clear what should have been clear
from 1788 onwards: civil and criminal litigation can only be conducted by the
United States government through officers of the United States and not
through mere employees.  Employees, of course, can play a role in those pro-
ceedings; officers need not gather every piece of evidence, argue every
motion, or attend every deposition.  But the basic decisions whether and how
to proceed with legal action must be made, in the final analysis, by officers of
the United States.  Since Special Counsel Robert Mueller conducted criminal
litigation in federal court by deciding who to charge, who to seek to indict,
and who to prosecute, he cannot be merely an employee of the federal
government.
This is roundly confirmed by the Supreme Court’s decision in Lucia v.
SEC,234 which held that administrative law judges (ALJs) of the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) are constitutional officers because they (1)
take testimony, (2) receive evidence and examine witnesses including taking
depositions, (3) conduct trials and administer oaths, (4) make decisions on
the admissibility of evidence, (5) issue subpoenas, and (6) have the power to
punish contumacious conduct.235  Seven justices of the Supreme Court in
Lucia thus had little trouble determining that the SEC’s administrative law
judges were officers of the United States and not mere employees.  Special
Counsel Robert Mueller has exercised the power to (1) conduct criminal
investigations anywhere in the United States and to convene grand juries;236
(2) indict U.S. citizens, as well as thirteen Russian citizens and three Russian
corporate entities, thus affecting U.S. foreign policy significantly;237 (3) seek
revocation of bail and the incarceration before trial of one U.S. citizen, Paul
232 Id. at 139.
233 Id. at 140.
234 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018).
235 See id. at 2053–54.
236 See Carol D. Leonnig et al., Special Counsel Mueller Using Grand Jury in Federal Court in
Washington as Part of Russia Investigation, WASH. POST (Aug. 3, 2017), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/politics/special-counsel-mueller-using-grand-jury-in-federal-
court-in-washington-as-part-of-russia-investigation/2017/08/03/1585da56-7887-11e7-8f39-
eeb7d3a2d304_story.html.
237 See Karen Yourish et al., Everyone Who’s Been Charged in Investigations Related to the
2016 Election, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/08/21/us/mueller-
trump-charges.html?mtrref=www.google.com&gwh=1C82584C4BDC79F397BB700B73B07
859&gwt=pay&assetType=REGIWALL (last updated May 23, 2019).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\95-1\NDL103.txt unknown Seq: 44 25-NOV-19 13:43
130 notre dame law review [vol. 95:1
Manafort;238 (4) investigate alleged obstruction of justice by the President of
the United States;239 (5) accept guilty pleas;240 (6) interview top White
House aides and request documents ordinarily protected by executive privi-
lege;241 (7) take testimony under oath and indict witnesses for lying to
him;242 and (8) issue subpoenas and question private citizens.243
As the Supreme Court said in Buckley v. Valeo, “[i]f a postmaster first
class, Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52 (1926), and the clerk of a district
court, Ex parte Hennen, 13 Pet. 230 (1839), are inferior officers of the United
States within the meaning of the Appointments Clause, as they are,”244 then
surely an official exercising the power wielded by Robert Mueller is at least
such an officer as well.  We are aware of only three possible bases for disa-
greement with this conclusion, and none is persuasive.
First, Justice Breyer would not have reached the constitutional issue in
Lucia but would instead have decided the case on statutory grounds; the stat-
utory provision for appointment of ALJs prescribed that appointments would
be made by the “agency,”245 which Justice Breyer took to mean “the Commis-
sion itself” rather than Commission staff or other lower-level functionaries.246
As a constitutional matter, however, Justice Breyer insisted that “the Appoint-
ments Clause is properly understood to grant Congress a degree of leeway as
to whether particular Government workers are officers or instead mere
employees not subject to the Appointments Clause.”247  To some extent, that
is clearly true, if all that is meant is that Congress can control whether some-
one is an officer by giving them more or fewer duties.  But we think that
Justice Breyer means something more than this.  There is no doubt, for
instance, that ALJs exercise a scope of authority more than sufficient to make
them constitutional officers.  We have always thought it somewhat mysterious
that it took until 2018 for that proposition to be settled in the law.  Justice
Breyer, however, seems to think that if Congress specifically says by statute
238 See Matt Apuzzo, Mueller Accuses Paul Manafort of Attempted Witness Tampering, N.Y.
TIMES (June 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/04/us/politics/paul-manafort-
mueller-witness-tampering.html.
239 See Michael S. Schmidt et al., Mueller Is Said to Seek Interviews with West Wing in Russia
Case, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/12/us/politics/
mueller-trump-russia-priebus.html.
240 See Ryan Teague Beckwith, Here Are All of the Indictments, Guilty Pleas and Convictions
From Robert Mueller’s Investigation, TIME (March 22, 2019), https://time.com/5556331/
mueller-investigation-indictments-guilty-pleas/.
241 See Schmidt et al., supra note 239.
242 See Yourish et al., supra note 237.
243 See Mark Hosenball, Mueller Issues Grand Jury Subpoenas to Trump Adviser’s Social Media
Consultant, REUTERS (May 16, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-muel
ler/mueller-issues-grand-jury-subpoenas-to-trump-advisers-social-media-consultant-idUSKC
N1IH2OB.
244 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976).
245 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (2012).
246 Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2057–58 (2018) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judg-
ment in part and dissenting in part).
247 Id. at 2062.
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that ALJs are not officers, with no change in their actual authority, this might
be enough to make them employees rather than officers.  Perhaps a similar
congressional pronouncement about special counsels would lead him to the
same conclusion.
Stated this baldly, we think the position is plainly wrong.  An officer is
not someone with a fancy title and a commission.  Officers have fancy titles
and commissions because they perform functions that make them officers.
According to Buckley, someone is an officer if they “exercis[e] significant
authority pursuant to the laws of the United States.”248  Recent scholarship
suggests, as a matter of original meaning, a broader understanding of
“officer,” under which anyone is an officer “whom the government entrusts
with ongoing responsibility to perform a statutory duty of any level of impor-
tance”249—meaning essentially that officers are people who exercise non-
trivial rather than, as Buckley would have it, significant governmental
authority.  In either case, the label follows the function rather than vice
versa—just as entities are government agencies, and thus subject to constitu-
tional requirements, by virtue of their real-world activities rather than legisla-
tive labels.  It is clear, for example, that Amtrak is an agency subject to the
First Amendment notwithstanding Congress’s declaration that Amtrak “will
not be an agency . . . or establishment of the United States Government.”250
As the Supreme Court explained, this statute
is assuredly dispositive of Amtrak’s status as a Government entity for pur-
poses of matters that are within Congress’s control—for example, whether it
is subject to statutes that impose obligations or confer powers upon Govern-
ment entities, such as the Administrative Procedure Act, the Federal Advi-
sory Committee Act, and the laws governing Government procurement . . . .
But it is not for Congress to make the final determination of Amtrak’s status
as a Government entity for purposes of determining the constitutional rights
of citizens affected by its actions.  If Amtrak is, by its very nature, what the
Constitution regards as the Government, congressional pronouncement that
it is not such can no more relieve it of its First Amendment restrictions than
a similar pronouncement could exempt the Federal Bureau of Investigation
from the Fourth Amendment.251
Similarly, while the Sarbanes-Oxley Act says that the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) “shall not be an agency or establish-
ment of the United States Government” and “[n]o member or person
employed by, or agent for, the Board shall be deemed to be an officer or
employee of or agent for the Federal Government by reason of such ser-
248 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126.
249 Jennifer L. Mascott, Who Are “Officers of the United States”?, 70 STAN. L. REV. 443, 454
(2018); see also James C. Phillips et al., Corpus Linguistics and “Officers of the United States,” 42
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 871, 873 (2019) (concluding that “the linguistic landscape” of the
original meaning of “Officers of the United States” is “messy, but more in line with Profes-
sor Mascott’s proffered definition than the Supreme Court’s ahistorical one”).
250 45 U.S.C. § 541 (1988).
251 Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 392 (1995) (citations omitted).
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vice,”252 that pronouncement “is about as interesting and profound as would
be a similar legislative declaration that, for example, FBI agents are not gov-
ernment officials for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.”253  In fact, the
Supreme Court in Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB254 gave that congressional
declaration no notice at all when applying the Constitution’s separation-of-
powers provisions to the PCAOB.  By the same token, the content of the term
“Officers of the United States” is a matter of constitutional law.  Congress is
free to opine on that matter, as it is free to opine on anything, but other
departments are free to give that legislative opinion on constitutional mean-
ing as much or as little weight as they wish.  The Constitution means what it
means, not what Congress (or any other institution) says that it means.
It is possible that Justice Breyer meant nothing more than that courts, as
a matter of judicial policy, should defer to the views of Congress in close cases
involving the actual constitutional meaning of the term “Officers of the
United States.”255  This would go to the issue of judicial discretion rather
than constitutional meaning, and it raises topics far beyond the scope of this
Article.  We note only that while legislative and executive interpretations of
the Constitution are, in principle, equivalent to, and just as deserving of def-
erence as, judicial interpretations, deference to another actor is normally jus-
tified by reasons of legitimacy (the other actor is deemed politically, even if
not legally, more appropriate as a decisionmaker); accuracy (the other actor
is more likely than the deferring actor to get the right answer): economics
(deferring is cheaper than deciding for yourself); signaling (the deferring
actor is communicating something to another actor by deferring); or strategy
(the deferring actor gains prestige or legal capital by deferring).256  This is a
case-specific inquiry, though it is possible that categorical judgments about
classes of cases might be reasonable in the right circumstances.  In this spe-
cific instance, it is not obvious how any or all of these considerations warrant
deference to congressional judgments about who is an “Officer of the United
States,” though we can imagine a case being built for such deference.  We
believe, however, that the correct answer in this instance is clear enough so
that deference to any actor would not change the outcome.
Second, law professors Seth Barrett Tillman and Josh Blackman have
argued that Lucia and other Supreme Court caselaw establishes that officers
252 15 U.S.C. § 7211(b) (2012).
253 Gary Lawson, The “Principal” Reason Why the PCAOB Is Unconstitutional, 62 VAND. L.
REV. EN BANC 73, 74–75 (2009).
254 561 U.S. 477 (2010).
255 See Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2062 (2018) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judg-
ment in part and dissenting in part) (“Congress’ intent in this specific respect is often
highly relevant.  Congress’ leeway is not, of course, absolute—it may not, for example, say
that positions the Constitution itself describes as ‘Officers’ are not ‘Officers.’  But given the
constitutional language, the Court, when deciding whether other positions are ‘Officers of
the United States’ under the Appointments Clause, should give substantial weight to Con-
gress’ decision.”).
256 See GARY LAWSON & GUY I. SEIDMAN, DEFERENCE: THE LEGAL CONCEPT AND THE LEGAL
PRACTICE (2019).
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must, at a minimum, occupy a “continuing” office.257  Because special coun-
sels are appointed only to perform specific, limited tasks and do not have
permanent, enduring positions, the argument is that they cannot be officers
but can only be employees.258  If that position is correct, then our argument
here is even stronger than we think it is.  Employees can only exercise powers
and perform functions appropriate to employees.  Those powers and func-
tions do not include all of the powers and functions of U.S. Attorneys, which
is what the Reno Regulations prescribe for special counsels.259  If those coun-
sels really are mere employees, virtually everything that they do is unlawful,
and any argument beyond that point about the legality of Mueller’s actions is
unnecessary.  But we do not think that this position is correct.
To be sure, Professors Tillman and Blackman, who specifically disavow
any intention of making claims about original meaning, make a plausible
case based on the language of Lucia260 and decisions that came before it.  In
United States v. Germaine, for example, the Court said that “the term [‘Officer
of the United States’]embraces the ideas of tenure, duration, emolument,
and duties, and that the latter were continuing and permanent, not occa-
sional or temporary.”261  The Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) also empha-
sized the “continuing” nature of an office in 2007 when it sought to
synthesize two centuries of caselaw concerning officer status.262  The idea
that lack of continuity in a position precludes officer status, for example,
explains away cases such as Auffmordt v. Hedden, in which a merchant
engaged by the Customs Service to appraise the value of imported goods was
not considered an officer; the many historical situations in which special
agents or envoys have been used in diplomatic missions without going
through the constitutional appointments process; and the long tradition of
qui tam litigation, in which private citizens can, in a limited fashion, sue on
behalf of the United States and collect bounties.263
But while this may suffice to establish that anyone who holds a continuing
position ought to be considered an officer, which would be consistent with
Professor Jenn Mascott’s findings about the original meaning of the Appoint-
ments Clause,264 it does not establish the converse.  As the OLC explained, “a
temporary position also may be continuing, if it is not personal, ‘transient,’
257 Seth Barrett Tillman & Josh Blackman, Is Robert Mueller an ‘Officer of the United States’
or an ‘Employee of the United States’?, LAWFARE (July 23, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/
robert-mueller-officer-united-states-or-employee-united-states.
258 See id.
259 See Reno Regulations, supra note 57.
260 See Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2051 (2018).
261 United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 511–12 (1879).
262 See Officers of the United States Within the Meaning of the Appointments Clause,
31 Op. O.L.C. 73, 73–74 (2007) [hereinafter Officers of the United States] (“[A] position,
however labeled, is in fact a federal office if (1) it is invested by legal authority with a
portion of the sovereign powers of the federal Government, and (2) it is ‘continuing.’”).
263 GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 201 (8th ed. 2019) (citation omitted).
264 See Mascott, supra note 249.
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or ‘incidental.’”265  Specifically, “[f]or example, the position of Attorney
General presumably still would be an office if Congress provided for it to
expire each year but reauthorized it annually.”266  Special counsels under the
Reno Regulations do not have the permanence of a statutorily authorized
office such as the Attorney General,267 but neither is the position personal,
transient, or incidental, such as the position of a special envoy.  The regula-
tions describe the nature and character of the position, not the identity of
the person who holds it.268  Today it is Robert Mueller; previously it was Pat-
rick Fitzgerald (or former Senator John Danforth); tomorrow it could be Jeff
Sessions.  Nor is it transient, like a one-time diplomatic endeavor or a short-
term contract to value imported goods.  Mueller served for almost two years.
And to call a position that exercises all of the powers of a U.S. Attorney “inci-
dental” is ridiculous.  Accordingly, notwithstanding some incidental (and
perhaps transient?) dicta in Supreme Court opinions, we think it clear that
the special counsel is an “Officer of the United States.”
Third, Justices Sotomayor and Ginsburg in Lucia “would hold that one
requisite component of ‘significant authority’ is the ability to make final,
binding decisions on behalf of the Government.  Accordingly, a person who
merely advises and provides recommendations to an officer would not herself
qualify as an officer.”269  ALJs are not officers under this standard because
their decisions can be reviewed and overruled by the commissions or agen-
cies for which they work.270  This approach, however, badly confuses the dis-
tinction between inferior and noninferior officers with the distinction
between employees and officers.  The Solicitor General and the Deputy
Attorney General, for example, can be reviewed and overruled by the Attor-
ney General, in whom is vested all powers in the Department of Justice.271
Does that mean that the Solicitor General and Deputy Attorney General are
not even “Officers of the United States”?  With all respect, we do not think
that Justices Sotomayor and Ginsburg, and the law clerks that advised them,
thought this through very carefully.
Accordingly, special counsels appointed under the Reno Regulations are
clearly “Officers of the United States” who must be appointed in conform-
ance with the Appointments Clause.  The only real question is whether they
can constitutionally be appointed by a department head rather than by the
President with the advice and consent of the Senate (assuming that Congress
enacts a statute permitting this mode of appointment).  The answer is no.
265 See Officers of the United States, supra note 262, at 100.
266 Id. at 113.
267 See Reno Regulations, supra note 57.
268 See id.
269 Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2065 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
270 See id. at 2066.
271 28 U.S.C. § 509 (2012).
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B. Robert Mueller Was a Superior Officer of the United States
It is helpful at this point to return again to the actual words of the consti-
tutional text.  The Appointments Clause provides again that the President
shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall
appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the
supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appoint-
ments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established
by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior
Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law,
or in the Heads of Departments.272
If an officer is not “inferior,” the Constitution leaves no wiggle room:
noninferior officers must be appointed by presidential nomination and sena-
torial confirmation.  The Reno Regulations can only pass a laugh test for
constitutionality if special counsels are inferior officers.
We do not speculate here about whether it would be possible for Con-
gress to create a special counsel who is constitutionally an “inferior” officer.
Perhaps it would, if the person’s duties were sufficiently limited and were
subject to supervision, direction, control, and firing at will by a superior
officer.  The existing 1999 Reno Regulations, however, specify that special
counsels exercise all powers of U.S. Attorneys.273  That is enough to make
them noninferior.  And even if one takes account of the faulty reasoning in
Morrison v. Olson, Robert Mueller was a noninferior officer under existing
caselaw.
1. Principal Officers Are a Subset of Superior Officers
Before we make that case, however, we need to clear up a terminological
point that has created some confusion in the lower courts that have consid-
ered challenges to Robert Mueller’s appointment.  The Appointments Clause
speaks of “Officers of the United States,” and then carves out a category of
“inferior” officers who can be appointed without presidential nomination
and senatorial confirmation.  The Constitution does not use any specific
term to describe those noninferior officers who must, regardless of Con-
gress’s wishes, be appointed through presidential nomination and senatorial
confirmation.  It is conventional today to describe those noninferior officers
as “principal” officers.274  Apart from an ambiguous reference in 1867,275 we
believe that this terminology first appeared in the Supreme Court in 1976 in
272 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
273 See Reno Regulations, supra note 57.
274 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation, 916 F.3d 1047, 1052 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (“As
interpreted by the Supreme Court, the Appointments Clause distinguishes between ‘princi-
pal officers,’ who must be nominated by the President with advice and consent of the
Senate, and ‘inferior officers,’ who may be appointed by the President alone, or by heads
of departments, or by the judiciary, as Congress allows.”).
275 See United States v. Hartwell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 385, 395 (1867).
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Buckley v. Valeo.276  Whatever its origins, the terminology is a mistake that has
the potential badly to mislead.
The term “principal Officer” does not appear in the Appointments
Clause, though it does appear in two other constitutional provisions.  First,
the Opinions Clause says that the President “may require the Opinion, in
writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon
any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices.”277  The phras-
ing of the Opinions Clause indicates that there is one and only one “princi-
pal” officer in each department, meaning that the “principal” officers are
really the “Heads of Departments” who are capable of appointing inferior
officers (or the chair of a multimember commission if such a commission can
be a constitutional “Department” with a collegial “Head[ ]” as an appointing
authority).278  Second, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment says:
Whenever the Vice President and a majority of either the principal
officers of the executive departments or of such other body as Congress may
by law provide, transmit to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the
President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice
President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as
Acting President.279
This provision also implies that there is exactly one principal officer in each
department.
This does not mean that all nonprincipal officers are inferior officers for
purposes of the Appointments Clause.  The residual counterpart to an infer-
ior officer is a superior officer, and many superior officers are not principal
officers.  This was very clear at the Constitutional Convention.  When the
inferior officers provision of the Appointments Clause was introduced by
Gouverneur Morris on September 15, 1787, James Madison claimed: “It does
not go far enough if it be necessary at all—Superior Officers below Heads of
Departments ought in some cases to have the appointment of lesser
offices.”280  Madison clearly had the understanding that the class of “Supe-
rior Officers” was broader than the class of department heads (or “principal
Officers”).  This distinction (contra the unfounded and uninformed observa-
tion of a district court judge that “there is little indication that anyone at the
Convention but [Gouverneur] Morris agreed with Madison”)281 was recog-
nized by others at the Constitutional Convention as well.  Rufus King, in dis-
cussing the Senate’s role in appointments, “did not suppose it was meant that
276 424 U.S. 1, 132 (1976) (“Principal officers are selected by the President with the
advice and consent of the Senate.  Inferior officers Congress may allow to be appointed by
the President alone, by the heads of departments, or by the Judiciary.”).
277 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
278 See United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 511 (1879).
279 U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4.
280 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 72, at 627.
281 In re Grand Jury Investigation, 315 F. Supp. 3d 602, 646 (D.D.C. 2018), aff’d, 916
F.3d 1047 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
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all the minute officers were to be appointed by the Senate, or any other origi-
nal source, but by the higher officers of the departments to which they
belong.”282  Whether one calls them “superior” or “higher” officers, the
Framers distinguished more important from less important officers, and the
scheme of appointment was based upon that distinction.
Thus, there are actually three categories of officers created by the Con-
stitution: (1) principal officers who are the heads of departments, who can be
compelled by the President to give opinions in writing, and who must partici-
pate in deliberations over the President’s disability to serve under the
Twenty-fifth Amendment; (2) superior (or “higher”) officers who include
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, Justices of the Supreme
Court (and judges of the inferior federal courts), deputy cabinet secretaries,
assistant cabinet secretaries, and permanent U.S. Attorneys; and, finally, (3)
inferior (or “minute”) officers whose appointments Congress can by law vest
in the President alone, the courts of law, and the heads of departments.
The discussions of the Appointments Clause at the Philadelphia Consti-
tutional Convention were almost exclusively about the appointment of
officers nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate.  For exam-
ple, Gouverneur Morris said on September 7, 1787, shortly before Rufus
King’s remarks quoted above: “[T]hat as the President was to nominate,
there would be responsibility, and as the Senate was to concur, there would
be security.”283  There was significant discussion at the Convention about the
appointment process for superior officers, but only one very brief meaning-
less and perfunctory conversation about the process for appointing inferior
officers on September 15, 1787: “The motion being lost by the equal division
(of votes,) It was urged that it be put a second time, some such provision
being too necessary, to be omitted, and on a second question it was agreed to
nem. con.”284  Obviously, the Founders’ Constitution envisioned a world
where superior officers would be very powerful and inferior officers would be
less significant.
The same understanding emerges from The Federalist, which says:
It will be agreed on all hands that the power of appointment, in ordinary
cases can be properly modified only in one of three ways.  It ought either to
be vested in a single man, or in a select assembly of a moderate number, or in
a single man with the concurrence of such an assembly. . . .
. . . .
The sole and undivided responsibility of one man will naturally beget a
livelier sense of duty and a more exact regard to reputation. . . .
. . . .
. . . [T]he necessity of the [Senate’s] concurrence [in nominations]
would have a powerful, though, in general, a silent operation.  It would be
282 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 72, at 539 (statement of Rufus
King) (emphasis added).
283 Id.
284 Id. at 627–28.
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an excellent check upon a spirit of favoritism in the President, and would
tend greatly to prevent the appointment of unfit characters from State
prejudice, from family connection, from personal attachment, or from a
view to popularity.285
Again, nothing at all is said about the inferior officer proviso in the Appoint-
ments Clause, while there is extensive discussion of appointment by presiden-
tial nomination and senatorial consent.  The same is evident again in The
Federalist No. 77, which also discusses the provisions for presidential nomina-
tion and senatorial consent while ignoring the inferior officer proviso.286  It
is obvious that the Founders’ Constitution never contemplated inferior
officers exercising as much power as does a special counsel with the full pow-
ers of a U.S. Attorney.
2. United States Attorneys, Inter Alia, Are Superior Officers
A world in which officers such as special counsels are inferior officers
bears no resemblance to the actual practice of the United States government
as it has functioned for 231 years, from 1788 to 2019.  No Attorney General
has ever claimed the power to appoint a whole shadow Justice Department
composed only of inferior officers, and such a claim would raise serious civil
liberties and federalism issues.  Moreover, Congress has from 1789 on
assumed that cabinet secretaries, permanent U.S. Attorneys, and lower fed-
eral court judges must be superior officers nominated by the President and
confirmed by the Senate.
If one thinks that Justice Breyer is right that some measure of deference
to Congress on the meaning of constitutional provisions regarding appoint-
ments is appropriate287: Congress has in hundreds of statutes passed over the
last 230 years helped elucidate, or liquidate, the meaning of the Appoint-
ments Clause by specifying, statutorily, which officers are superior officers
and which are inferior officers.  These framework statutes enacted by Con-
gress and signed into law by the President are legislative and executive
department determinations as to where the constitutional line falls between
superior officers and inferior officers, and as a matter of first principles those
views are as significant as are rulings of the Supreme Court.288  Congress’s
285 THE FEDERALIST NO. 76, 370–72 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jim Miller ed., 2014) (first
emphasis added).
286 THE FEDERALIST NO. 77, 375 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jim Miller ed., 2014) (“The
blame of a bad nomination would fall upon the President singly and absolutely.  The cen-
sure of rejecting a good one would lie entirely at the door of the Senate . . . . If an ill
appointment should be made, the executive, for nominating, and the Senate, for approv-
ing, would participate, though in different degrees, in the opprobrium and disgrace.”).
287 See supra note 255 and accompanying text.
288 The literature and history of this “departmentalism” account of constitutional inter-
pretation is too voluminous even for string citation.  For the thoughts of one of us on the
matter, see Gary Lawson, Interpretative Equality as a Structural Imperative (Or “Pucker Up and
Settle This!”), 20 CONST. COMMENT. 379, 380 (2003); Lawson & Moore, supra note 79 at
1270.
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longstanding statutory regime under which deputy cabinet secretaries, assis-
tant cabinet secretaries, and permanent U.S. Attorneys are superior officers
is, for those who believe in such things,289 a constitutional construction
reflecting long-standing settled practice on which hundreds of millions of
people have relied for 230 years.  Since the Judiciary Act of 1789, U.S. district
court judges, U.S. District Attorneys (today called U.S. Attorneys), and U.S.
Marshals have all been treated as superior officers whose appointments
require presidential nomination and senatorial consent.
The definitive work on the history of the U.S. Department of Justice is
Homer Cummings and Carl McFarland’s Federal Justice: Chapters in the History
of Justice and the Federal Executive.290  The authors explain that provision for
both the Attorney General of the United States and for the District Attorneys,
as the present U.S. Attorneys were initially called, was made in section 35 of
the Judiciary Act of 1789.  That Act required that both the Attorney General
and the District Attorneys be “person[s] learned in the law.”291  The District
Attorneys were to act in each district of the United States which had a district
court “as attorney for the United States . . . to prosecute . . . all delinquents
for crimes and offences, cognizable under the authority of the United States,
and all civil actions in which the United States shall be concerned.”292  Cum-
mings and McFarland note that “the Judiciary Act in its final form left the
appointment of both the Attorney General and the district attorneys to the
President and Senate.”293
Homer Cummings, who was President Franklin Roosevelt’s Attorney
General from 1933 to 1939, recognized that every Congress since 1789 has
been of the view that U.S. Attorneys had to be nominated by the President
and confirmed by the Senate.  Thus, the Senate Executive Journal indicates that
the Senate passed the Judiciary Act of 1789 on September 24, 1789, and that
very same day President George Washington immediately nominated six per-
sons to the U.S. Supreme Court, as well as a number of District Attorneys and
U.S. Marshals.294  One day later, on September 25, 1789, President Washing-
ton nominated a district judge, a District Attorney, and a Marshal for New
Jersey and New York, as well as nominating a Secretary of State, an Attorney
General, and a Postmaster General.295  Two days after passing the Judiciary
Act of 1789, on September 26, 1789, the Senate advised and consented to all
six of the President’s Supreme Court nominees and to the district judge, Dis-
trict attorney, and Marshal for the Districts of Maine, New Hampshire, Massa-
289 The authors of this Article do not fully agree on the appropriate weight to be given
to long-settled legislative and executive practices.
290 See generally HOMER CUMMINGS & CARL MCFARLAND, FEDERAL JUSTICE (1937).
291 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92.
292 Id.
293 CUMMINGS & MCFARLAND, supra note 290, at 18.
294 See 1 JOURNAL OF THE EXECUTIVE PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA 29 (Washington, D.C., Duff Green 1828) [hereinafter JOURNAL OF THE EXECU-
TIVE PROCEEDINGS].
295 See id. at 32–33.
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chusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, South
Carolina, Georgia, Kentucky, New York, and New Jersey.296  Only after the
Senate had advised and consented to the District Attorney nominees did the
Senate turn to President Washington’s cabinet nominations.  The Senate
then advised and consented to the nominations of Thomas Jefferson to be
Secretary of State, Edmund Randolph to be Attorney General, and Samuel
Osgood to be Postmaster General.297
The very same day, on September 26, 1789, President Washington
signed Richard Harrison’s commission appointing him to be the first District
Attorney for the District of New York.298  Sixty people have been nominated
by the President and confirmed by the Senate between 1789 and 2014 to be
the U.S. Attorney, first for the District of New York, and then for what was
called the Southern District of New York.299  Throughout this 225-year
period of time, all sixty U.S. Attorneys in that district were nominated by the
President and confirmed by the Senate.300  This is significant because the
U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York is widely considered to
be the most important U.S. Attorney in the Department of Justice.
The tradition of a newly elected President picking his own District Attor-
ney and U.S. marshal began with President Thomas Jefferson in 1801.  As
Cummings and McFarland note:
The new administration recognized that to win control of the judiciary,
so solidly placed in Federalist hands through the appointment of judges,
would prove far more difficult than had been the capture of the Presidency
and Congress.  While Jefferson disapproved any general dismissal of govern-
ment officers for partisan reasons, he felt something should be done.  “The
courts being so decidedly federal and irremovable,” he wrote, “it is believed
that republican attorneys and marshals, being the doors of entrance into the
courts, are indispensably necessary as a shield to the republican part of our
fellow-citizens.”301
Accordingly, President Jefferson, for example, appointed Edward Livingston,
a signer of the Declaration of Independence, to replace Richard Harrison as
the second District Attorney for the District of New York in 1802.302  Every
permanent U.S. Attorney from 1789 to 2019 has been treated as a superior
officer nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate.
It is a matter of common knowledge that U.S. senators care a great deal
about who is the U.S. Attorney in their home state, and Presidents negotiate
with care with the relevant state’s senators before Presidents nominate some-
296 See id. at 29–32.
297 See id. at 33.
298 COMM. FOR THE BICENTENNIAL CELEBRATION (1789–1989) OF THE U.S. ATTORNEY’S
OFFICE FOR THE S. DIST. OF N.Y., 225 YEARS (1789–2014): THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK, at iv & n.1 (2014).
299 See id. at i, iv.
300 See id.
301 CUMMINGS & MCFARLAND, supra note 290, at 53.
302 See 1 JOURNAL OF THE EXECUTIVE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 294, at 403.
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one to be a U.S. Attorney.  We think the Senate would find the view,
expressed by one district court judge,303 that the Attorney General can just
appoint ninety-three inferior officer equivalents to U.S. Attorneys and thus
bypass the nomination and advice and consent functions of the President
and the Senate to be absolutely absurd given the ramifications this would
have for federalism, for the separation of powers, and for the protection of
civil liberties.
There is no direct caselaw for the proposition that deputy and assistant
cabinet secretaries and permanent U.S. Attorneys are superior officers.  But
neither is there caselaw (one hopes) for the proposition that the sky is blue.
The United States Code has consistently been so clear in providing that dep-
uty and assistant cabinet secretaries and permanent U.S. Attorneys are supe-
rior officers that no one has ever had occasion to litigate the matter.
It is true that since 1863 interim U.S. Attorneys have been treated by stat-
ute as inferior officers appointed by local district courts.304  One might there-
fore try to analogize special counsels to interim U.S. Attorneys—or even to
extend that doctrine to conclude that permanent U.S. Attorneys are inferior
officers.  Indeed, judicial and OLC opinions have on occasion erroneously
referred to U.S. Attorneys as being inferior officers, based at least in part on
the history of interim U.S. Attorneys.305  Both moves should be fiercely
resisted.
We have grave doubts about the constitutionality of the present provi-
sion for appointment of interim U.S. Attorneys.  The provision for court
appointment of interim U.S. Attorneys originated in 1863, as part of a short
bill for improving the “efficiency”—in the midst of a war—of the judicial
department.306  We can find no relevant legislative history regarding this pro-
vision, which has been carried forward since 1863 without reexamination,
except for one brief period early in this millennium.  In 2005, the USA
PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act removed the courts from
the process of appointment for interim U.S. Attorneys, allowing only the
Attorney General to make interim appointments and placing no time limit
on how long the interim appointees can serve (though forbidding the Attor-
ney General from appointing anyone who the Senate had previously
rejected).307  In 2007, in the wake of controversy (whether real or contrived
is irrelevant to this point) about the second Bush administration’s hiring and
firing of U.S. Attorneys, the law was amended to its present form.308  We can
303 See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 315 F. Supp. 3d 602, 642 (D.D.C. 2018), aff’d, 916
F.3d 1047 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
304 See 28 U.S.C. § 546(d) (2012).
305 See, e.g., United States v. Gantt, 194 F.3d 987, 999 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Because United
States Attorneys are ‘inferior’ officers, § 546(d) passes constitutional muster.”).
306 See Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 93, § 2, 12 Stat. 768, 768.
307 See USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-
177, § 502, 120 Stat. 192, 246 (2006) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 546).
308 See Preserving United States Attorney Independence Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-
34, § 2, 121 Stat. 224, 224 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 546).
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find no express discussion of the Appointments Clause issue in the legislative
history of that 2007 amendment, although Representative James Sensenbren-
ner issued a short separate statement indicating that the 2005 amendment
had been added “to correct a flaw in the law that permitted the judicial
branch to appoint U.S. Attorneys.”309  There is also a footnote in the main
report that reminds us that U.S. Attorneys were not subject to the direction
of the Attorney General until 1870.310  Before that, they were answerable
only to the President, which means that in 1863, there is no doubt at all that
they were superior officers.
We understand why a Congress in the midst of a civil war in 1863, in an
era without ready means of travel or instantaneous communication, might
find it convenient to allow on-the-spot judges to appoint U.S. Attorneys, per-
haps even on or near the front lines of battle on short notice, without involv-
ing the President or the Senate.  But understanding it does not make it
constitutional.  U.S. Attorneys, whether permanent or interim, have the
power to deprive people of life, liberty, or property.  The powers to convene
grand juries and direct the issuance of subpoenas and indictments are enor-
mous powers.  There is nothing inferior or minute about that authority—and
we explain in the next section why the extent of an officer’s authority is cru-
cial to understanding whether the officer is superior or inferior.  However
convenient it might be to allow appointment of prosecutorial officers by
judges, officers with the level of power of U.S. Attorneys are superior officers
who must be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the
Senate.  We can perhaps excuse the Congress of 1863 for overlooking this
point.  We would hope that modern Congresses (and executives and courts)
in times of peace can do better.
Even if one accepts the precedent of interim U.S. Attorneys being
appointed as inferior officers, that should not in any way color one’s judg-
ment about permanent U.S. Attorneys or special counsels.  From 1789 to
2019—for a period of 230 years—noninterim U.S. Attorneys have always
been treated as superior officers of the United States.  That is because they
are in fact, and always have been in fact, superior officers of the United
States.  Special counsels who exercise the same power as U.S. Attorneys are
also superior officers for exactly the same reasons.  We now turn to this cru-
cial point that far too many modern courts do not seem to grasp.
B. U.S. Attorneys, and Special Counsels, Exercise Too Much Power to Be
Considered Inferior Officers
When one says that a particular actor is “inferior” in an organizational
hierarchy, one can mean either or both of two things.  First, one can mean
that there is someone higher than the actor within the organizational hierar-
chy—someone who can review and, if necessary, overrule the actor’s deci-
sion.  This is how the Constitution uses the term “inferior” in connection
309 H.R. REP. NO. 110-58, at 19 (2007).
310 See id. at 3 n.6.
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with the federal courts.  Courts of appeals and district courts (and, we
believe, state courts when Congress so designates them) are “Tribunals infer-
ior to the supreme Court.”311  This inferiority is a decisional inferiority—the
Supreme Court can review and control the decisions of inferior tribunals.312
As the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, recognized in 1997 in
Edmond v. United States,313 this notion of decisional hierarchy plays an impor-
tant role in the Appointments Clause as well:
Generally speaking, the term “inferior officer” connotes a relationship
with some higher ranking officer or officers below the President: Whether
one is an “inferior” officer depends on whether he has a superior. . . .  [W]e
think it evident that “inferior officers” are officers whose work is directed
and supervised at some level by others who were appointed by Presidential
nomination with the advice and consent of the Senate.314
If this account in Edmond is taken as the full specification of inferior
officer status, then special counsels under the Reno Regulations would
clearly be inferior officers, as special counsels operate under the supervision
of the Attorney General.  On that reasoning, however, U.S. Attorneys would
also be inferior officers, as they also are hierarchically inferior to the Attor-
ney General.  So would be Assistant Attorneys General, the Solicitor General,
the Deputy Attorney General, and every other person in the Department of
Justice other than the Attorney General.  The same analysis would apply to
every government agency, as every person who is not at the very head of the
agency is hierarchically inferior to the person (or, in a multimember commis-
sion, the group of persons) at the top of the organization chart.  Federal
court of appeals judges and district court judges would also be inferior
officers, as they are hierarchically inferior to the Supreme Court.
In short, taking this account in Edmond as the exclusive basis for distin-
guishing inferior from superior officers reduces the latter category to the set
of principal officers, with exactly one (or possibly more than one in a multi-
member commission) noninferior officer in every department or agency of
the government.  On this reasoning, Congress might choose, as a matter of
policy, to have presidential nomination and senatorial consent for additional
officers, but the Constitution will require it only for principal officers.
For reasons that we have already given, this is completely ridiculous.  It is
not a position that can be advanced with a straight face.  It makes such spec-
tacular hash of the constitutional structure and constitutional history that we
do not believe that anyone seriously advances it (though given the arguments
that have recently been made and accepted by lower courts, perhaps that
belief is too generous); certainly the U.S. government is not about to argue
that everyone in the Department of Justice except the Attorney General is an
311 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9.
312 See Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, Essay, The Unitary Executive, Jurisdiction Strip-
ping, and the Hamdan Opinions: A Textualist Response to Justice Scalia, 107 COLUM. L. REV.
1002, 1016–25 (2007).
313 520 U.S. 651 (1997).
314 Id. at 662–63.
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inferior officer.  And, of course, it was not Justice Scalia’s position, nor ours a
decade ago,315 nor the Constitution’s.
The decision in Edmond held that judges on the Coast Guard Court of
Criminal Appeals are inferior officers who may be appointed by the Secretary
of Transportation.316  To show their place in the administrative hierarchy,
the majority opinion emphasized the control that could be exercised over
those judges “by the General Counsel of the Department of Transportation
in his capacity as Judge Advocate General.”317  The Judge Advocate General
is, of course, not a principal officer in the strict constitutional sense of the
term; the Judge Advocate General “in the Coast Guard is subordinate to the
Secretary of Transportation.”318  This acknowledges the possibility that Jus-
tice Scalia contemplated in his dissenting opinion in Morrison v. Olson in
1988: “To be sure, it is not a sufficient condition for ‘inferior’ officer status
that one be subordinate to a principal officer.  Even an officer who is
subordinate to a department head can be a principal officer.”319  Justice
Scalia here was using the term “principal officer” to mean what we call a
“superior officer”—which clearly acknowledges that there can be superior
officers who are not constitutionally principal officers or (what amounts to
the same thing) heads of departments.
So if an officer, such as the Judge Advocate General of the Coast Guard,
can be a superior officer while still answering to someone else in the organi-
zational hierarchy (in this case the Secretary of Transportation), what makes
them superior and the Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals judges
inferior?
The answer is that there is a second possible meaning of “inferior” in the
context of the Appointments Clause and thus two distinct constitutional
paths to being a superior officer.  One is recognized by Edmond: an officer
who does not answer to anyone in the executive hierarchy other than the
President is, by definition, a superior officer, as there is no one to whom they
can be inferior.  That is why officials such as the judges on the Patent Trial
and Appeal Board are superior officers; there is no internal executive review
of their decisions, which represent the final word in the executive depart-
ment.320  On some occasions, one can therefore determine superior officer
status simply by examining the executive hierarchy.  One might even be able
to determine inferior officer status in many cases through the same hierar-
chical examination.  An officer who is buried beneath many layers of supervi-
sory review is very unlikely to bear any label other than inferior officer.
But there is another understanding of inferiority, and thus another path
to superior officer status that can exist even if the officer answers to someone
315 See Calabresi & Lawson, supra note 312, at 1020.
316 See Edmond, 520 U.S. at 666.
317 Id.
318 Id. at 664.
319 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 722 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
320 See Gary Lawson, Appointments and Illegal Adjudication: The AIA Through a Constitu-
tional Lens, 26 GEO. MASON L. REV. 26 (2018).
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else in a hierarchy.  It is true that one meaning of “inferior” in the Appoint-
ments Clause—as well as in the Tribunals Clause321 and Article III322—
describes the relationship of one authority to another in a hierarchical chain
of command.  But that is not the only way in which the term “inferior” was
used during the founding era regarding the authority of government offi-
cials.  For example, in the late eighteenth century, a court whose decisions
were not subject to review by any other court could nonetheless sometimes
be called an “inferior court” if its jurisdiction or geographic scope was not as
extensive as those of other courts, and those courts with broader authority
would therefore be “supreme” even if they had no control over the decisions
of the “inferior” courts.323  Many states during the founding era had exactly
this kind of nonhierarchical court system in which courts labeled “supreme”
did not necessarily have ultimate review authority over “inferior” courts but
simply had wider and broader jurisdiction.324  This is why an early draft of
Article III at the Constitutional Convention proposed creating “one or more
supreme tribunals,”325 recognizing that one could have coexisting “supreme”
authorities.  “Inferior” does not exclusively mean “subject to control, direc-
tion, and review.”  It means that much, to be sure, but it can also mean more
in certain contexts.
As Justice Souter perceptively wrote in his concurring opinion in
Edmond:
Because the term “inferior officer” implies an official superior, one who
has no superior is not an inferior officer. . . .
It does not follow, however, that if one is subject to some supervision
and control, one is an inferior officer.  Having a superior officer is necessary
for inferior officer status, but not sufficient to establish it.326
The additional element is the importance and power of the office.
It has been the longstanding practice of Congress and the executive
department to recognize superior officer status for all important and power-
ful public officials even if they have a boss who can fire them.  Cabinet secre-
taries, of course, have always been treated as being superior (and indeed
principal) officers even though they can be fired by the President.  More to
the point, deputy and assistant cabinet secretaries, ambassadors, the Deputy
Attorney General, the Solicitor General, and permanent U.S. Attorneys are
all superior officers who must be nominated by the President and confirmed
by the Senate, even though they can be supervised, directed, and fired by the
321 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9 (giving Congress power to “constitute Tribunals
inferior to the supreme Court”).
322 See id. art. III, § 1 (vesting the judicial power “in one supreme Court, and in such
inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish”).
323 See David E. Engdahl, What’s in a Name? The Constitutionality of Multiple “Supreme”
Courts, 66 IND. L.J. 457, 466–72 (1991).
324 See id. at 468–72.
325 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 72, at 21.
326 Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 667 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment).
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cabinet secretary to whom they report, as well as by the President.  The Solici-
tor General, for example, answers to the Attorney General, who is “the head
of the Department of Justice,”327 and can displace or direct the Solicitor
General in the representation of the United States.328  But given the Solicitor
General’s baseline power to supervise the conduct of litigation on behalf of
the United States, it seems obvious that he or she is a superior officer not-
withstanding the hierarchical superiority of the Attorney General.  The same
is true, for the same reasons, of the Deputy Attorney General and the Assis-
tant Attorneys General and, we believe, of U.S. Attorneys as well.  They have
this status, as a matter both of statutory practice and of constitutional com-
mand, because the importance and power of the office to which they are
appointed is so great.  It is unthinkable that, for example, the Deputy Secre-
taries of State or of Defense or the Deputy Attorney General or Solicitor Gen-
eral could be appointed as inferior officers.  These officials simply exercise
too much power to be denominated inferior officers, even though they are
supervised and directed by a higher-ranking officer.  They are superior
officers, who must be nominated by the President and confirmed by the
Senate.
Turning to the federal judiciary, we find that U.S. court of appeals
judges and U.S. district court judges have always been treated as being supe-
rior officers even though their decisions could be overruled by the Supreme
Court.  No one thinks or should think that Congress could vest in the
Supreme Court the power to appoint lower-court judges as inferior officers.
It is obvious that lower-court judges must be superior officers nominated by
the President and confirmed by the Senate.  Even though they are lower than
another body in an organizational hierarchy, their powers are so large that
they cannot be considered inferior officers.
The point can be generalized at a more abstract level: the functions per-
formed by an appointee have two distinct layers of constitutional signifi-
cance.  One is to determine whether the appointee is an “Officer of the
United States.”  The duties must rise to some level of importance—“signifi-
cant authority” according to Buckley v. Valeo,329 nontriviality according to Pro-
fessor Mascott—or the appointee is an employee rather than an officer.  But
once one has met the threshold for being an officer, the significance of the
functions has a second potential impact: highly significant functions can
make one a superior officer.  There is little caselaw on this dimension of
superiority and inferiority, for the simple reason that Congress is typically
reluctant to cede away the Senate’s confirmation power for officers who exer-
cise substantial enough power to raise a constitutional issue—which itself is
sufficient reason to doubt whether 28 U.S.C. § 543 or any other statutory
provision cedes away that authority for special counsels with the power of
Robert Mueller in the absence of specific language.  The courts have never
had to decide whether the Deputy Attorney General, the Solicitor General,
327 28 U.S.C. § 503 (2012).
328 See id. § 518.
329 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976).
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the Assistant Attorneys General, and the noninterim U.S. Attorneys are infer-
ior officers, because Congress has never tried to authorize their appointment
by any method other than the method appropriate for superior officers.  Nor
do we have an adjective that we think captures in all settings the level of
importance of functions that makes one a superior officer.  As we have
explained at great length elsewhere, not every constitutional norm can be
reduced to a clear bright-line rule; there are contexts in which the Constitu-
tion prescribes standards rather than rules.330  Standard-like norms pre-
scribed by the Constitution are still constitutional norms.  If they do not take
an aesthetically pleasing form, that is just too bad.
There are, to be sure, lower-court cases holding that interim U.S. Attor-
neys are inferior officers.331  These cases do not explore the issues that we
raise here but address only the extent to which U.S. Attorneys are subject to
the control and direction of the Attorney General.  For example, one court,
citing only an 1878 case from the Court of Claims,332 asserted “[t]he Consti-
tution does not use the term ‘inferior’ ‘in the sense of petty or unimportant’
but in the sense of a subordinate to a principal officer.”333  If taken as a
broad generalization, that is flatly untrue, as we have shown.  Another case,
by the same token, argued that “[a]n officer’s status as inferior or principal is
not absolute, but relative to those around him.  If Congress designs a govern-
ment position in order to provide a supervisor for a group of officers who
formerly were independent, those officers become inferior to the new
officer.”334  That is true if the reason why an officer is inferior is grounded in
the officer’s location within the executive hierarchy.  It is plainly not true if
the officer’s status is determined by the scope of the powers exercised by the
officer.  The Deputy Attorney General is a superior officer for purposes of
the Appointments Clause even if the Attorney General gives one of his or her
special assistants an oversight role over the Deputy Attorney General.
In any event, wherever the line between superior and inferior officers is
drawn, Assistant Attorneys General and the ninety-three permanent U.S.
Attorneys are on the superior side of the line.  As we described earlier,335
their jobs are so important and powerful that they simply have to be
appointed by presidential nomination and senatorial advice and consent.
The same is true of special counsels.  Special counsels exercise all the
power of a U.S. Attorney.  If the latter is a superior officer, so are the former.
Senators would (rightly) be furious if the Attorney General appointed infer-
ior officer special counsels to conduct federal prosecutions in their home
330 See Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, The Rule of Law as a Law of Law, 90 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 483, 487 (2014).
331 See, e.g., United States v. Hilario, 218 F.3d 19, 25–26 (1st Cir. 2000); United States v.
Gantt, 194 F.3d 987, 999 (9th Cir. 1999).
332 Collins v. United States, 14 Ct. Cl. 568, 574 (1878).
333 Gantt, 194 F.3d at 999.
334 Hilario, 218 F.3d at 26.
335 See supra notes 327–28 and accompanying text.
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states, thereby bypassing the confirmation process.  It is obvious that a special
counsel, like a permanent U.S. Attorney, simply has to be a superior officer.
Consider one example of a special counsel: Robert Mueller.  Mueller
acted and behaved like a superior officer even though he was never nomi-
nated by the President nor confirmed by the Senate.  In fact, Mueller was
much more powerful than is a permanent U.S. Attorney because he had
nationwide jurisdiction and could indict foreign citizens and corporations,336
as he did when he indicted more than a dozen Russian citizens and three
Russian business entities.337  This action had a major effect on our foreign
policy with Russia.338  Mueller’s actual powers are greater than those of a
permanent U.S. Attorney and are perhaps more akin to those of an Assistant
Attorney General.  It is crystal clear that Mueller was a superior officer.
With respect to analogizing special counsels to interim U.S. Attorneys
because of the limited duration of their appointments: Robert Mueller served
for nearly two years.  As Justice Scalia said of Alexia Morrison’s equivalent
service as an independent counsel, that is “at least as long as many Cabinet
officials.”339  If one is going to accept the inferior-officer status of interim
U.S. Attorneys as a matter of precedent, there is no ground for extending
that (misguided) precedent beyond its narrow facts.
We also think we may have been too hasty in earlier proclaiming more
than a decade ago that Edmond v. United States overruled Morrison v. Olson sub
silentio.340  Instead, Edmond added to Morrison the important caveat that one
could not be an inferior officer if one did not have a superior.  That does not
foreclose being a superior officer even if one has a superior.  As we said a
decade ago:
An officer can be answerable to someone else and yet still be a [superior]
officer because of the importance of the scope of the duties, but an officer
who does not answer to anyone other than the President is necessarily a prin-
cipal officer because he or she will be the head of a department.341
To be sure, the majority opinion in Morrison v. Olson does not leap to
our minds as the first place to look for guidance in drawing the line between
superior and inferior officers.  We have no reason to think that Morrison was
asking the right question for this inquiry, much less effectively and dispas-
sionately seeking and reaching the right answers.  Nonetheless, for those who
care about such things, Morrison was a 7–1 decision of the U.S. Supreme
Court that has not formally been overruled in this respect.  Accordingly, it is
worthwhile (though just barely, according to one of us) to consider how spe-
336 See Appointment Memo, supra note 2.
337 See Breslow, supra note 12.
338 Elias Groll, Mueller’s Most Lasting Legacy May Be on K Street, FOREIGN POL’Y (Mar. 28,
2019), https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/28/muellers-most-lasting-legacy-may-be-on-k-
street-fara-lobbying-foreign-agents/.
339 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 718 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
340 See Calabresi & Lawson, supra note 312, at 1018.
341 Id. at 1020 (footnote omitted).
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cial counsels such as Robert Mueller fare under the inquiry prescribed by
Morrison.
C. Even Under the Test of Morrison v. Olson, Robert Mueller as Special
Counsel Is a Superior Officer
The Morrison v. Olson test for officer inferiority held that a statute could
not constitutionally interfere with the President’s executive power “too
much” by giving executive power to so-called inferior officers, thus taking
away the President’s nomination power.  Specifically, Chief Justice Rehnquist
said in his majority opinion for the Supreme Court in Morrison v. Olson that
four factors must be considered to determine whether an officer can prop-
erly be deemed an inferior officer.  First, the officer must be removable by a
boss.342  Second, the officer must perform only “certain, limited duties.”343
Third, the officer must be limited in jurisdiction.344  And, fourth, the officer
must be given a job with a fixed ending point.345
The first part of the Morrison inquiry is close to meaningless if it is taken
literally.  If being removable by another executive officer makes one inferior,
every executive officer except the President and Vice President is inferior.
Employees who are in the civil service are harder to remove than officers.
We must assume, therefore, that this statement was not meant to be taken
literally but rather to focus attention on the degree of control and direction
to which an officer is subject, with removal functioning as one mechanism
(along with overruling of decisions) for exercising that control and direction.
That is why the Court in Edmond interpreted Morrison as meaning “that ‘infer-
ior officers’ are officers whose work is directed and supervised at some level
by others who were appointed by Presidential nomination with the advice
and consent of the Senate.”346
But for the same reasons that one cannot literally take removability per
se as a mark of inferiority, one cannot literally take the existence of any mea-
sure of direction and supervision per se as the mark of inferiority.  Otherwise,
every officer who is not a principal officer will be inferior.  In the context of
the Department of Justice, to say that the special counsel is inferior because
“governing statutes give the Acting Attorney General broad authority to
direct and supervise the Special Counsel”347 is also to say that the Deputy
342 See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 671.
343 Id.
344 See id. at 672.
345 See id.
346 Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 663 (1997).  Nor can one reason from
removability by a department head rather than the President to inferior officer status,
because that has matters exactly backwards.  Who can remove an officer depends on the
character of the officer, not vice versa.  Congress cannot give the Attorney General power
to remove the Secretary of State and thereby make the Secretary of State an inferior
officer.
347 In re Grand Jury Investigation, 315 F. Supp. 3d 602, 629 (D.D.C. 2018), aff’d, 916
F.3d 1047 (D.C. Cir. 2019).  The district court correctly focused on statutes rather than
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Attorney General, the Solicitor General, the Assistant Attorney Generals, and
the U.S. Attorneys are inferior officers for the same reasons.  The same stat-
utes that give the Attorney General (or acting Attorney General) power to
make ultimate decisions within the Department of Justice348 apply to those
offices as much as they apply to the special counsel.  No one has ever thought
that Morrison v. Olson, or Edmond v. United States, establishes that there is one
and only one noninferior officer in the Department of Justice (and probably
in each and every federal department).  Rather, the only remotely plausible
interpretation of Morrison and Edmond is to say that officers who are subject
to a great deal of direction and control are more likely to be inferior than are
officers who are subject only to the level of direction and control that is
inherent in being anything other than a principal officer.  Thus, the Solicitor
General is a superior officer because, inter alia, there are very few people in
the DOJ who can direct or overrule decisions of the Solicitor General.  An
assistant U.S. Attorney, on the other hand, can be directed and overruled at
multiple levels.  In Edmond, the judges of the Coast Guard Court of Criminal
Appeals could be directed in various ways by the Court of Appeals for the
Armed Forces,349 the Judge Advocate General,350 and the Secretary of
Homeland Security (previously the Secretary of Transportation) who
designates the Judge Advocate General of the Coast Guard.351  Of course the
sheer number of layers of review cannot be dispositive, as the degree of con-
trol and direction is also a function of the size and structure of the organiza-
tion and the overall portfolios of the various officers.  But an officer in the
Department of Justice who is answerable only to the Attorney General is obvi-
ously not inferior.
So how to explain the result in Morrison (without simply dismissing it as
absurd)?  The Morrison opinion famously said: “We need not attempt here to
decide exactly where the line falls between the two types of officers, because
in our view appellant clearly falls on the ‘inferior officer’ side of that line.
Several factors lead to this conclusion.”352  Removability was one factor among
many, not something that was dispositive.  It was factually true that the inde-
pendent counsel’s removability “by the Attorney General indicates that she is
to some degree ‘inferior’ in rank and authority.”353  Similarly, the removabil-
ity of the special counsel indicates that he is “to some degree ‘inferior’ in
rank and authority.”354  The question is whether that degree, and that kind,
regulations as the source of control and direction because any regulations can be altered
or repealed by the Attorney General at will. See id. at 627–28; see also United States v.
Concord Mgmt. & Consulting LLC, 317 F. Supp. 3d 598, 615–16 (D.D.C. 2018) (also not-
ing that the regulations can be rescinded).
348 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 509 (2012).
349 See 10 U.S.C. § 867 (2012).
350 See id. § 866; Edmond, 520 U.S. at 664 (“[T]he Judge Advocate General may also
remove a Court of Criminal Appeals judge from his judicial assignment without cause.”).
351 See 10 U.S.C. § 801(1).
352 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 671 (1988) (emphasis added).
353 Id.
354 Id.
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of inferiority is enough to make him an inferior officer under the Appoint-
ments Clause.  As in Morrison, where the Court did not stop its analysis in its
tracks at this mention of removability, one must keep looking at the rest of
the picture.
The second part of Chief Justice Rehnquist’s four-part test was clearly
violated by the Robert Mueller appointment.  Robert Mueller was not
“empowered . . . to perform only certain, limited duties.”355  Whereas the
Supreme Court held in Morrison that Alexia Morrison could be a court-
appointed independent counsel because she was only prosecuting one for-
mer government official, Ted Olson, for two alleged crimes, Robert Mueller
investigated alleged criminal activity by the President of the United States, his
personal lawyer (whose attorney-client privilege has been breached), and
anyone even remotely connected to the President or the President’s political
campaign.  He indicted more than two dozen individuals.  He secured guilty
pleas in several cases and a guilty verdict in another.  The difference between
Alexia Morrison’s power and Robert Mueller’s power could not be starker.
Mueller’s appointment violated the second part of the Morrison test by
not limiting his office only to certain, limited duties, and it violated the third
part of the Morrison test because Mueller’s office was not one whose jurisdic-
tion is sufficiently limited.  As we have seen, Mueller’s jurisdiction extended
across the globe and to a dizzying array of persons and alleged crimes.  To
say, as did one district court,356 that Mueller performed only certain, limited
duties is akin to saying that General Dwight D. Eisenhower performed only
certain limited duties in World War II because he only oversaw the D-Day
invasion of France and not the war against the Japanese in the Pacific.  As for
a fixed end point to Mueller’s investigation: the world waited for that for
quite some time.
The D.C. Circuit in In re Grand Jury Investigation did not analyze Muel-
ler’s appointment under the Morrison test.  Instead, drawing on Edmond, it
focused on “degree of oversight, final decision-making authority, and remov-
ability.”357  The court claimed that any limitations on the Attorney General’s
supervisory authority contained in regulations were not legally significant
because the regulations could always be changed or repealed.358  It also
noted that the Attorney General can remove the special counsel at any
time.359  Thus, the court concluded, “[t]he control thereby maintained
means the Special Counsel is an inferior officer.”360  For the reasons that we
have given, a single-minded focus on control and direction leads to the pre-
posterous conclusion that only principal officers are superior officers.  The
Attorney General cannot remove the Solicitor General, but the Attorney
355 Id.
356 See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 315 F. Supp. 3d 602, 640–44 (D.D.C. 2018), aff’d,
916 F.3d 1047 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
357 In re Grand Jury Investigation, 916 F.3d at 1052.
358 See id.
359 See id.
360 Id. at 1053.
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General can control every one of the Solicitor General’s actions (and even
take them on personally).  Does that make the Solicitor General an inferior
officer?  If the Supreme Court really meant such a thing in Morrison, Edmond,
or Free Enterprise Fund, one might have expected a more explicit declaration
to that effect.  If there are indeed superior officers who are not principal
officers—and any other conclusion is absurd—then one needs a subtler anal-
ysis than courts seem currently willing to provide.
Control and direction are important to the inquiry whether someone is
a superior or inferior officer.  An officer who has the last word within the
executive department is necessarily superior.  But many superior officers are
controlled and directed by others.  If the lower courts are not going to reason
this out for themselves, we urge the Supreme Court to clarify the law.  A good
start would be to stop calling noninferior officers “principal” officers if they
are not heads of departments.  This simple linguistic misstep might be doing
a grave disservice to the Constitution and the rule of law.
CONCLUSION
As we said in the Introduction, there are times when it makes sense to
use special counsels.  If the high-ranking officials in the Department of Jus-
tice would be investigating themselves or their political allies, there is reason
to doubt whether they can perform those functions with at least the appear-
ance of objectivity.  Special counsels are fine in principle.  But there are law-
ful and unlawful ways to go about creating special counsels.
The Department of Justice should write a new regulation, replacing the
1999 Janet Reno Regulations, specifying that, in the future, special counsels
shall be appointed from among the ranks of the permanently appointed U.S.
Attorneys.  This is an amply large talent pool of superior officers from among
whom an appropriately independent special counsel can always be chosen.
As we said in the Introduction, just as U.S. Attorney for the Northern District
of Illinois, Patrick Fitzgerald, constitutionally prosecuted Scooter Libby in
the District of Columbia, so too could acting Attorney General Rod Rosen-
stein have asked one of the permanent, Senate-confirmed U.S. Attorneys to
investigate and prosecute collusion with Russia.  Former Attorney General
Jeff Sessions asked the U.S. Attorney for Utah, John W. Huber, to investigate
alleged wrongdoing by the FBI; and former U.S. Attorney for Maryland, Rod
Rosenstein, was asked to investigate alleged leaking in Washington, D.C. by
former Attorney General Eric Holder.  There is an obviously lawful way to
investigate presidential and cabinet-level wrongdoing, and that is by asking a
Senate-confirmed permanent U.S. Attorney to undertake the investigation in
addition to his other duties.
Our reading of the relevant statutes and the Appointments Clause would
allow a future Attorney General to ask any of the existing U.S. Attorneys to
serve as a special counsel in a case of alleged presidential wrongdoing.  That
arrangement is perfectly constitutional.  Among that group of ninety-three
presidentially nominated and Senate-confirmed personnel one can surely
find someone with the intellect, integrity, and character to be a special coun-
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sel as well as a U.S.  Attorney.  But, importantly for constitutional law pur-
poses, a special counsel who is also a permanent U.S. Attorney is, by the
nature of the office, a superior officer nominated by the President and con-
firmed by the Senate.  There was neither the legal authority nor any need to
pluck Robert Mueller out of retirement and private life, and make him
unconstitutionally one of the most powerful people in Washington.
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